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Privacy Rights, Public Policy,
and the Employment Relationship
PAULINE T. KIM*
Two well-established common law doctrines increasingly are coming into
conflict. The first protects individuals from unreasonable intrusions on their
privacy. The second authorizes an employer to fire its employees at will, unless
a clear agreement exists to the contrary. As employees have begun to assert
their common law right of privacy' in the workplace, their claims have collided
headlong with the doctrine of employment at will.
The conflict became apparent during the legal struggles over the
permissibility of drug testing in the workplace. In a typical case, Richard
Johnson, a twenty-three year employee of Carpenter Technology Corporation,
was fired after he refused to submit to a suspicionless drug and alcohol
urinalysis screen.2 Because he was employed by a private firm, federal
constitutional privacy protections did not apply.3 And because he had been
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1 In contemporary parlance, "rights" are often understood to protect the individual
against the actions of the state. The tort of invasion of privacy is unusual among modern
torts in referring to the interest it protects as a "right" which may be invoked against other
private individuals. David Leebron has explored the intellectual roots of the privacy tort and
how the rights-based conception of the common law it suggests is at odds with the fault-
based conception of tort liability which emerged at the end of the nineteenth century and
now predominates. See David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual
History of Tort Law, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 769 (1991). Whatever its conceptual
origins, the privacy tort is still discussed in terms of a "right," and I follow conventional
terminology in this Article by referring to a common law "right of privacy."
2 See Johnson v. Carpenter Tech. Corp., 723 F. Supp. 180, 181-82 (D. Conn. 1989).
3 See id. at 185.
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promoted to a supervisory position eighteen years earlier, Johnson could no
longer rely on the just-cause provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 4
Instead, Johnson alleged that his dismissal was wrongful because it violated a
public policy protecting employee privacy rights.5 Although acknowledging the
existence of a common law right of privacy, the court found it insufficient to
overcome the at-will doctrine and rejected Johnson's wrongful discharge
claim. 6
Sarah Borse, like Richard Johnson, was fired after many years of service
when she refused to consent to suspicionless urinalysis drug testing and
personal property searches by her employer. 7 She, too, claimed that her
dismissal was wrongful, and the Third Circuit, applying Pennsylvania law,
reached the opposite conclusion from the Johnson court.8 Finding the common
law tort of invasion of privacy to be evidence of a public policy protecting
employee privacy, the court held that a discharge is wrongful despite the
employee's at-will status where it is "related to a substantial and highly
offensive invasion of the employee's privacy." 9 Other courts which have
considered whether the common law right of privacy limits an employer's
authority to fire an at-will employee for refusing to submit to drug testing are
similarly divided. 10
4 See id. at 181.
5 See id. at 185.
6 See id. at 186. Johnson also raised breach of contract claims in challenging his
termination. See id. at 182. He alleged that the employer was bound by oral promises ofjob
security made to induce him to accept a promotion and by the procedures set forth in its
drug and alcohol policy manual. See id. at 182-83. Based on these allegations, the court
denied summary judgment and permitted Johnson to proceed on his contract claims. See id.
Nevertheless, its holding for the at-will employee, who cannot rely on any explicit
agreement, is clear: common law privacy rights offer no protection against discharge for
asserting those rights. See id. at 186.
7 See Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 613 (3d Cir. 1992).
8 See id. at 626.
9 Id. at 622.
10 Compare Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 499-502 (rex. Ct.
App. 1989) (rejecting plaintiff's claim of wrongful discharge based on invasion of common
law right of privacy) with Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52, 55 (W. Va. 1991)
(recognizing right of privacy as public-policy limitation on at-will rule) and Luedtke v.
Nabors Ala. Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1989) (concluding that violation of
public policy protecting employee privacy may breach covenant of good faith and fair
dealing implied in at-will employment contract).Cf. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co.,
267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 634-35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (California constitutional right to privacy
is not public-policy exception to at-will rule); Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1990) (California constitutional right of privacy is fundamental principle of public
policy sufficient to state cause of action for wrongful termination).
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The conflict between employee privacy rights and employer prerogative
extends far beyond the issue of drug testing. Employers and employees have
long struggled over the degree of privacy employees should be afforded while
at work, and the legitimate scope of employer inquiries into their behavior off
the job. Personal property searches, intrusive questionnaires, mandatory
polygraph testing and pre-employment psychological screening all have faced
legal challenges. 11 The recent introduction of new technologies into the
workplace raises still more privacy issues. Employers now have an
unprecedented ability to monitor virtually every aspect of an employee's
activities throughout the day using video surveillance, electronic
eavesdropping, and computer monitoring techniques. 12 In addition, computers
make possible the compilation of vast amounts of information about the
employee's financial status, buying habits and lifestyle off duty. 13 While
employees complain that intrusive employer practices cause unnecessary stress
and unfairly invade their privacy, employers argue that their increased ability to
monitor employee behavior both on and off the job will improve productivity,
lower health care costs, and reduce losses from theft and other employee
misconduct. 14
11 See, e.g., Borse, 963 F.2d 611 (drug testing and personal property search);
Gretencord v. Ford Motor Co., 538 F. Supp. 331 (D. Kan. 1982) (vehicle search); Soroka
v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (psychological screen);
Cort v. Bristol-Myers Co., 431 N.E.2d 908 (Mass. 1982) (questionnaire); K-Mart Corp. v.
Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (search of employee locker and purse);
Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984) (polygraph testing).
12 See U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, THE ELECTRONIC
SUPERvIsoR: NEW TECHNOLOGY, NEW TENSIONS (1987); L. CAMILLE HBERT, EMPLOYEE
PRIVACY LAW § 8A.01 (1996). A recent survey of business executives found that 22% of
respondents had engaged in searches of employee computer files, voice mail, and e-mail.
Based on those results, it was estimated that some twenty million Americans may be subject
to some kind of electronic monitoring or surveillance on the job. See id. (citing Charles
Piller, Bosses with X-Ray Eyes: Your Employer May Be Using Computers to Keep Tabs on
You, MACWORLD, July 1993, at 118, 120, 123).
13 See Richard Lacayo, Nowhere to Hide: Using Coputers, High-Tech Gadgets and
Mountains of Data, an Army of Snoops Is Assaulting Our Privacy, TIME, Nov. 11, 1991, at
34; Jeffrey Rothfeder et a]., Is Nothing Private? Computers Know a Lot About You-And
They're Quite Rilling to Tell, Bus. WK., Sept. 4, 1989, at 74; Jim Schachter, U.S. Industry
Does a Poor Job of Protecting Privacy, Study Says, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1989, § 4 at 1.
14 See 9 TO 5, WORKING WOMEN EDUCATION FUND, STORiES OF MISTRUST AND
MANULATION: THE ELECTRONIC MoNrroRnG OF THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE (1990);
Pamela Burdman, Employee Privacy in Peril in the High-Tech '90s, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 11,
1992, at BI; Laurie Flynn, Big Brother Is Watching You WorklProgram Monitor Use of
Computers, HOUSTON CHRON., June 20, 1993, at 4; Veronica Fowler, Is the Boss Watching
You While You Work?, GANNEqr NEWS SERV., Nov. 12, 1992; Carol Kleiman, Delving into
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Although conflicts over workplace privacy are increasing, legal analysis of
the issue remains fragmented. Typically, concerns about potentially invasive
employer practices are discussed seriatim-Is polygraph testing unduly
invasive? Does drug testing unfairly infringe on employee privacy? Should
electronic monitoring be prohibited?-with each debate having little reference
to the others. This fragmented way of thinking about workplace privacy is
reflected in the structure of the law. A number of federal and state statutes
regulate aspects of employee privacy, but each addresses only a particular,
narrowly defined invasion. For example, separate federal statutes regulate the
use of polygraph testing, credit reports, and medical examinations by
employers. 15 Similarly, over half the states have statutes regulating the use of
polygraphs in employment; at least fourteen limit employer drug testing plans;
and nearly two dozen forbid adverse employment actions based on off-duty
tobacco use. 16 No statute, however, deals with the issue of employee privacy in
any comprehensive way.
My primary concern in this Article is with the privacy rights of
unorganized, private-sector employees. Unlike public employees, they cannot
turn to the Constitution for protection of their personal privacy, 17 nor can they
Private Lives a Sticky Ismue in Interviews, Cr. TRm., Aug. 2, 1992, Jobs section at 1; Carol
Kleiman, Worker Privacy Right Puts Businesses to Test, CHI. Tai., July 23, 1989, Jobs
section at 1; Lacayo, supra note 13, at 34; Ronald Rosenberg, Most Workers in Survey
Think Employers Use Electronic Means to Spy on 7l7m, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 9, 1989, at
10; Jeffrey Rothfelder et al., Is Your Boss Spying on You? High-Tech Snooping in 'the
Electronic Sweatshop, 'Bus. WK., Jan. 15, 1990, at 74.
15 The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994),
prohibits polygraph testing by private employers except in certain statutorily defined
circumstances. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1994), permits
the use of consumer credit reports in making employment decisions, but imposes certain
requirements relating to the disclosure and accuracy of the information. The Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), regulates employer-mandated
medical inquiries and examinations. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
16 See MATTHEWW. FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 220-365 (1995); see also
IRA MICHAEL SHEPARD ET AL., WORKPLACE PRIVACY, app. A (2d ed. 1989) (containing
state-by-state listing of laws regulating specific aspects of employee privacy such as drug
testing, polygraph testing, AIDS testing, medical screening, and prior criminal records).
17 In rare cases, where a private employer is acting as an instrument or agent of the
government, constitutional privacy protections may extend to workers in the private sector.
See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 614 (1989); cf. Foster v.
Ripley, 645 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that First Amendment applies to
private employment given extensive government involvement with employer); Holodnak v.
Arco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 289-90 (2d Cir. 1975) (same). In addition, a very few
jurisdictions have held that the state constitutional right of privacy applies directly to private
actors. See, e.g., Hl v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994); Nakano v. Matayoshi, 706
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rely on any requirement of due process to check arbitrary employer actions.
And with union membership rates among private sector employees barely
above ten percent,18 the vast majority have no collectively bargained agreement
to limit the employer's prerogative to determine the terms and conditions of
employment. For the typical private sector employee, the only general source
of legal protection from unjustified employer intrusions is the common law.
Although the common law tort of invasion of privacy does offer protection
against all manner of unreasonable intrusions on employee privacy, its
application in the workplace is complicated by the conflicting right of the
employer to terminate the relationship at will. Most courts that have considered
the issue agree that an employer may be liable in tort for unreasonable
intrusions on employee privacy after the fact. Thus, for example, liability for
invasion of privacy may arise when an employer enters an employee's home
without permission, 19 searches an employee's locker and purse,20 or inquires
into an employee's sexual relationship with her husband. 21 However, when the
employer gives notice in advance that it intends to engage in the same intrusive
practices, the protection offered by the common law tort is problematic. If the
employee accedes to the employer's intrusive practices (or merely continues to
work after receiving notice), her employer will likely assert that she consented
to the intrusion as a defense to her claim that her privacy was wrongfully
invaded. 22 If, on the other hand, she objects to the intrusion and is fired as a
P.2d 814, 818 (Haw. 1985). The exceptions are extremely limited; generally, private
employees receive little protection from either state or federal constitutions.
18 See UNITED STATES BuRE-Au OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE
UNIED STATEs 443 (1995).
19 See Love v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 263 So. 2d 460 (La. Ct. App. 1972)
(finding employer liable for invasion of privacy where supervisors entered employee's
locked home ater employee failed to appear for work).
20 See K-Mart v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632 (lex. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that an
employer search of employee locker and purse may give rise to liability for invasion of
privacy).
21 See Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983) (finding
that an employer may be liable for invasion of privacy for supervisor's inquiries into
plaintiff's sexual relationship with her husband).
22 The extent to which a defense of consent will be successful is unclear. As on so
many issues relating to employee privacy, the courts appear to be divided. Conpare
Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 500-02 (1ex. Ct. App. 1989)
(noting that consent amounts to absolute defense in any tort action based upon invasion of
privacy-plaintiff's economic circumstances are irrelevant) with Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666
F.2d 824, 829 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that consent not valid if required as a condition of
employment or continued employment) and Leibowitz v. H.A. Winston Co., 493 A.2d 111,
115 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding consent not valid if given under compulsion). In Part V
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result, the common law privacy tort provides no relief, because no invasion of
her privacy has occurred. She has suffered the loss of her job, but no loss of
privacy. It is at this point that the interpretation of the at-will doctrine becomes
crucially important. If applied strictly, the employee cannot recover for the loss
of her job either, and will be left without recourse, regardless how invasive the
employer's threatened actions were, or how justified her refusal to comply with
her employer's demands.
My central argument here is that any meaningful protection of employee
privacy requires limitation of an employer's power to fire at will. I begin by
exploring the current status of the employment at will doctrine in Part I.
Although the employer's power to terminate is now limited in several
significant respects, the vast majority of nonunionized private-sector employees
still have little legal basis for challenging arbitrary dismissals. In Part I, I
consider the wide variety of contexts in which a legal right of "privacy" has
been invoked, and the resulting difficulty in precisely defining the contents of a
general right of privacy. Rather than searching for a unitary definition which
can explain every legal claim to privacy, I tam instead to the specific legal
doctrine most relevant in the context of private employment: the common law
tort of invasion of privacy. In Part 1II, I explore the structure of the common
law tort of invasion of privacy and the role it plays in enforcing societal norms
regarding personal privacy. Drawing on sociological literature describing
patterns of human interaction, I argue that observation of those norms by others
is critical to the individual's sense of self. Although the precise areas or aspects
of life designated as private will vary depending upon the cultural context and
the relationship between the parties, their significance lies in the entitlement
they grant to the individual to determine whether and when to permit another
access.
I next consider in Part IV how an individual's ordinary expectations of
privacy might be affected by the existence of the employment relationship.
Although privacy interests are inevitably compromised in the course of
employment, I argue that the employer has legitimate access to those areas
socially designated as highly private-what I call "core" privacy interests-
only to the extent necessary to achieve the purposes of the employment.
Further intrusions threaten the very interests the common law tort of invasion
of privacy purports to protect. Part V addresses the arguments traditionally
made in favor of a "free" market approach to employment contracts and their
inadequacy in addressing concerns of employee privacy. Finally, in Part VI, I
consider what an accommodation of employee privacy rights in an at-will
below, I argue against a formalistie application of the doctrine of consent which fails to take
account of the concrete circumstances under which employee acquiescence to intrusive
employer practices is obtained.
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regime might look like and conclude that the common law right of privacy
should be recognized as a public-policy exception to the at-will doctrine.
I. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
The basic common law rule governing the employment relationship is
easily stated: in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the employment
relationship is presumed to be at will, and either party may terminate it at any
time. Just as the employee is free to quit her job for any reason at all, the
employer may discharge an employee "for good cause, for no cause, or even
for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." 23
On its face, the at-will rule is nothing more than a presumption. If the
parties were silent as to the duration of employment at the time the relationship
was entered into, the employment is presumed to be at will. The parties are
always free to agree otherwise, by expressly contracting that the employment
will last for a specified period of time. Although phrased in terms of a
presumption, the at-will rule at times more nearly operated as a substantive rule
establishing the terms of the employment relationship. Earlier this century, the
presumption of at-will employment was applied with such vigor that it was
virtually impossible to overcome.2 4 Courts refused to enforce even explicit
agreements of job security based on technical contract doctrines, 25 and the
United States Supreme Court blocked legislative attempts to limit an
employer's power to fire at will as unconstitutional interferences with freedom
of contract.2 6
Eventually the Supreme Court reversed its position27 and a number of
statutes now include provisions forbidding the discharge of employees for
certain enumerated reasons. 28 Although the statutory restrictions on an
23 Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915).
24 See Clyde W. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual
Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1082,
1097-99 (1984).
25 See, e.g., Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 266 N.W. 872 (Minn. 1936).
26 See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-75 (1908).
27 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937).
28 For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (1994), forbids discharge because of an employee's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1994), and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994),
similarly limit discriminatory discharges based on age or disability. Other federal laws
prohibit employers from dismissing employees for asserting certain statutory rights. See,
e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1994) (stating that discrimination
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employer's right to fire might appear numerous, they are generally narrow in
scope and quite specifically defined. Rather than altering in any way the basic
presumption, these restrictions on the employer's acknowledged prerogative to
fire at will are understood as limited incursions necessary to advance other
legislative purposes, such as assuring safe and healthful working conditions for
workers. 29
The strength of the at-will presumption has been more significantly eroded
by common law developments. The once nearly irrebuttable presumption may
now be overcome in a number of ways. The existence of an agreement
permitting termination only "for cause" may be established not only by a
written contract specifying a fixed term of employment, but by oral assurances
of job security as well. 30 Personnel manuals specifying grounds and procedures
for termination have been held to create enforceable obligations on the part of
the employer, limiting its authority to terminate an employee at will. 31 At least
one court has found that an employee's longevity of service, together with the
employer's personnel practices and assurances of continued employment, create
an implied contract not to terminate without cause.32 Some courts have even
been willing to enforce an "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing"
implicit in every employment contract. 33
against or discharge of employee for exercising rights under the NLRA is an "unfair labor
practice"); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1994) (stating that it is
unlawful to discharge an employee for filing a complaint under the FLSA); Occupational
Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1994) (forbidding the discharge of employee for
filing complaint pursuant to OSHA); Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1140 (1994) (forbidding the discharge of an employee for exercising ERISA rights); and
Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a) (1994) (prohibiting discharge of any
individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by FMLA).
29 See, e.g., Marshall v. Intermountain Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 260, 262 (10th Cir.
1980).
30 Although a guarantee ofjob security may be based on an oral statement, courts have
generally looked to surrounding circumstances for evidence that the employer intended to
make a binding promise before holding that an enforceable contract exists. Thus, assurances
ofjob security made to encourage an employee to decline another offer of employment and
stay on the job have been held to create a binding contract, see Shebar v. Sanyo Bus. Sys.
Corp., 544 A.2d 377, 383 (N.J. 1988), while casual words of encouragement made outside
the context of specific job negotiations generally are not sufficient. See Rowe v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268, 274-75 (Mich. 1991).
31 See, e.g., Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314 (Il.
1987); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980);
Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J.), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J.
1985).
32 See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
33 See, e.g., Mitford v. de Sala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1983); Merrill v. Crothall-
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In addition to contract theories, aggrieved employees have alleged various
torts in challenging their terminations. 34 The most significant of these is
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The public-policy exception to
the at-will rule rests, not on the express or implied intent of the parties, but on
external constraints imposed by the interests of the general community. In the
classic fact pattern, an employer who fires an employee for refusing to commit
a crime is liable for wrongful discharge. Despite an employee's at-will status,
courts are willing to impose limits on an employer's power of dismissal when
that power is wielded in a manner harmful to community interests.
35
Numerous commentators, observing this weakening of the at-will
presumption, have called for its complete abandonment.3 6 Most critics of the
American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96 (Del. 1992); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364
N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
Recognition of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts
does not eliminate the at-will presumption, but merely carves out a limited exception when
the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith.
3 4 In a few jurisdictions, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
sounds in tort, see, e.g., K-Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1368-73 (Nev. 1987),
although the trend is to limit good faith claims to contract damages. See ARCO Alaska, Inc.
v. Akers, 753 P.2d 1150, 1153-54 (Alaska 1988); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765
P.2d 373, 389-401 (Cal. 1988); Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 748
(Idaho 1989). Discharged employees have asserted other tort causes of action, such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress and defamation, against their former employers,
but these claims are usually directed at the manner or circumstances of the discharge rather
than the reasons for the discharge itself. See, e.g., Wilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d
1138 (5th Cir. 1991); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976).35 See, e.g., Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959) and cases cited infra notes 202-12.
36 See, e.g., Janice R. Bellace, A Right of Fair Dismissal. Enforcing a Statutory
Guarantee, 16 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 207 (1983) (proposing that states adopt statutory
guarantees of protection for unjust discharge); William B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as
Property in Contemporary America" The Legal and Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986
BYU L. REV. 885 (1986) (arguing for state legislation establishing a just cause standard for
employment termination); Joseph Grodin, Toward a Wrongful Termination Statute for
California, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 135 (1990) (arguing for just cause legislation); Arthur S.
Leonard, A New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REv. 631 (1988)
(arguing for judicial abandonment of the at-will presumption); Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust
Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OmRo ST. LJ. 1 (1979)
(arguing for judicial adoption of a just cause standard); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed
Gernnates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. Rnv. 56
(1988) (arguing for just cause statute); Jack Stieber & Michael Murray, Protection Against
Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 319 (1983)
(arguing for a federal statute protecting employees against unjust discharge); Clyde W.
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rule have focused on its unfairness and the harsh effects it works on the
individual employee, although a few writers have argued for doing away with
the rule on grounds of economic efficiency.37 Reformers have called for
legislation establishing a "just cause" standard for dismissals, or judicial
reformulation of the common law rule, replacing the at-will presumption with a
"for cause" presumption.
Despite the many calls for reform, the at-will rule has retained its vitality
and, if anything, has been regaining strength in recent years. Courts are once
again raising the barriers to overcoming the at-will presumption. Contract
theories, which once promised discharged employees a likely avenue of relief,
are now easily defeated by simple modifications in employer practices. For
example, the inclusion of a disclaimer in a personnel manual negates any claim
that its provisions constitute an enforceable promise by the employer.38
Similarly, courts have backed away from the implications of recognizing and
enforcing an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts. Thus, the practical reality for the vast majority of employees today is
employment at will.39 These employees have little recourse against arbitrary
employer action unless the circumstances of their dismissal happen to fall into
one of the narrowly defined exceptions to the rule.40
The at-will rule is not without its defenders, of course. The most
prominent among them is Richard Epstein who argues in favor of the contract
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Wine for a Statute, 62 VA. L.
REV. 481 (1976) (arguing for a just cause statute).
17 See, e.g., Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongfid Discharge: The
Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1816 (1980) (arguing that the at-
will rule is inefficient because it fails to account for transaction costs and information
barriers on contract bargaining); cf. Leonard, supra note 36, at 676-78 (arguing that
economic considerations do not necessarily support retaining the at-will rule).
38 See, e.g., Robinson v. Christopher Greater Area Rural Health Planning Corp., 566
N.E.2d 768, 772 (l. App. Ct. 1991); Federal Express Corp. v. Dutschmann, 846 S.W.2d
282, 283 (rex. 1993).
39 Currently, less than 11% of private sector employees are union members, see
UNrrED STATES BUREAU OF THE CENsus, STATISTICAL ABSTRACt OF THE UNrrED STATES
443 (1995), and individual employment contracts providing for job security are extremely
rare.
4 0 In the early 1980s, Stieber and Murray estimated that some 140,000 nonunionized
workers with more than six months service were discharged each year who would have
been entitled to reinstatement under a just cause standard. See Stieber & Murray, supra note
36, at 322-24. Stieber and Murray's calculations were based on the assumption that 22% of
nonagricultural workers are represented by labor organizations. See id. at 322. Since that




at will on grounds of both fairness and utility. 41 His fairness argument is a
familiar one-"[f]reedom of contract is an aspect of individual liberty" and
ought not be restricted absent some principled justification.42 Given its
prevalence in the business world, he argues, those who would abolish the
contract at will bear a heavy burden of justifying the infringement on the liberty
of both employers and employees who prefer such arrangements. 43 Epstein
further contends that the at-will contract in fact benefits both employers and
employees by providing a low-cost mechanism for insuring against abuses on
both sides.44 Just as the threat of firing maintains employee discipline, the
employee's power to quit is an effective means of limiting employer abuses,
according to Epstein. 45 Moreover, this arrangement has the virtue of being
informal and self-enforcing; either party can exercise its ultimate power to
terminate a relationship which is no longer beneficial without having to resort
to expensive litigation. 46
The conflict between the employee's privacy rights and the employer's
power to discharge at will could be viewed as an aspect of the debate over the
wisdom of the at-will rule itself. Unjustified intrusions on employee privacy
represent one form of abusive exercise of employer power under an at-will
regime. Conversely, the adoption of a universal "just cause" standard would
provide greater protection for employee privacy because refusal to submit to an
unjustified invasion of privacy would be unlikely to constitute adequate cause
for dismissal.47 However, wholesale abandonment of the at-will rule seems
4 1 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense ofthe Contract at Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 947
(1984).
4 2 Id. at 953-54.
43 See id
44 See id. at 963-65.
4 5 See id. at 966.
46 See id. at 970.
4 7 The decisions of arbitrators interpreting job security provisions of collective
bargaining agreements show how a "just cause" standard would affect employee privacy
rights. See, e.g., Utah Power & Light Co., 94 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233, 243 (1990)
(Winograd, Arb.).
The only way an employee may preserve his right of privacy is to refuse to permit the
invasion of privacy in the first place and, thereby, to accept the possibility that he will
be discharged. If the employee is correct in his position that the demand of his
employer.., is an improper invasion of privacy, the employee is justified in his refusal
to obey his employer's order, and he is entitled to reinstatement... with full back
pay ....
19961
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
unlikely. Since 1987, when Montana passed a statute mandating good cause for
employment dismissals, 48 efforts to enact just cause protections have died
down. With little likelihood of legislative modification of the at-will rule,
courts will increasingly confront the central question raised here: what happens
when an employee's common law right of privacy comes into direct conflict
with the employer's power to fire at will?
Clearly, the right to fire at will is not absolute. It has come into conflict
with fundamental public concerns before, and yielded. Almost all the states
recognize an exception to the at-will rule based on public policy. Even the
staunchest defenders of employment at will acknowledge some legitimate
exceptions to the rule, as when the performance of a public duty or the
protection of a public right is threatened. 49 The disputed point, then, is not
whether the at-will rule should be limited, but when. I argue in this Article that
protection of employee privacy warrants limitation of an employer's
prerogative to fire at will. Employee privacy rights are equally fundamental to
and no different in kind than interests which have already been widely
acknowledged as exceptions to the at-will rule. Of course, any proposal to
further limit the at-will rule must meet the arguments of Epstein and others that
legal incursions on the contracting process are not only unnecessary but
inefficient as well. In Part V, infra, I consider in greater detail the classical
economic arguments against recognizing further exceptions to the at-will rule,
and conclude that they are inadequate to decide issues of individual privacy in
the employment context. But first, a fuller account of privacy is needed-what
it means, why it is valued, and what is its legal status. It is to these questions
that I now turn.
II. THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY
The concept of privacy as a distinct legal right originated with Warren and
Brandeis's famous 1890 article entitled The Right to Privacy.50 In it, they
argued that the existing common law recognized a principle of "inviolate
personality" which could be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual.51
Although arguing eloquently for explicit recognition of a right to privacy, they
offered little in the way of definition, beyond locating privacy as "part of the
more general right to the immunity of the person-the right to one's
48 See Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act, MoNT. CODE ANN.
§§ 39-2-901 to -914 (1991) (originally enacted in 1987).
49 See Epstein, supra note 41, at 952.
50 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REy.
193 (1890).
51 See iU. at 205.
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personality." 52 Soon after, the first courts began to recognize a tort cause of
action for invasion of privacy, often expressly relying on the Warren and
Brandeis article.53 Since then, acceptance of a common law right of privacy has
spread, such that it is now recognized in virtually all American jurisdictions. 54
In a parallel development, the concept of privacy has made its way into
constitutional jurisprudence. Although nowhere mentioned in the Constitution,
privacy has been found to be protected by the "penumbras" of the Bill of
Rights, as well as by several specific amendments to the Constitution. A
general constitutional right of privacy protects at least two types of interests:
"One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions," 55 such as those relating to marriage, procreation, and
childrearing.56 More specific protections are found in the First Amendment,
which protects "privacy in [one's] associations," 57 and the Fifth Amendment,
which guards "the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where he may
lead a private life,'" through strict application of the privilege against self-
incrimination. 58 The concept of privacy is also central to interpreting the
Fourth Amendment, for it prohibits unreasonable intrusions whenever an
individual has a reasonable "'expectation of privacy.'" 59
As its legal significance has grown, privacy has increasingly become the
subject of academic debate. Some writers have argued that the concept of
privacy is wholly "derivative" of other more fundamental rights, 60 and that its
52 Id. at 207.
53 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117,
at 850 (5th ed. 1984). After an initial setback when the New York Court of Appeals rejected
the existence of such a right in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y.
1902), the common law right of privacy was decisively recognized in 1905 by the Georgia
Supreme Court in Pavesid v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). See
KEETON r" AL., supra, § 117, at 851. Pavesich became the leading case on which other
courts relied in finding a common law right of privacy. See id.
54 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 53, § 117, at 851; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652A cmt. a (1977).
55 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (footnotes omitted).
56 See id. at 600 n.26.
57 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 467 (1977); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
58 Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (quoting United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956) (Franklin, J., dissenting) rev'd 353 U.S.
391 (1957)).
59 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967) (Hrarlan, J., concurring)).60 See Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean By "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D. L. REv. 1,
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recognition as a legal right is "a mistake." 6' Others have defended it in the
most exalted terms, as necessary for "human dignity and individuality" 62 and
"essential to democratic government." 63 Privacy has been linked with the most
fundamental of values-personal autonomy, liberty, and the basic human
relationships of love, friendship, and trust.64 It has also been decried as a
"petty" tort.65
Despite the importance many ascribe to it, privacy has proven difficult to
define. This difficulty arises in part because of the variety of doctrinal sources
found to offer protection from intrusions on privacy. Under the common law
tort of invasion of privacy, private actors have been held liable for
unauthorized entry into a private home,66 commercial appropriation of an
individual's name or likeness, 67 and publishing embarrassing private facts
about an individual. 68 Constitutional privacy rights have been invoked to
protect individual decisions regarding contraception, 69 abortion, 70 and the
withdrawal of life support. 71 First Amendment privacy concerns have
prohibited the compelled disclosure of one's associational ties, 72 as well as the
criminalization of private possession of sexually explicit materials. 73 And
20 (1959) ("Invasion of privacy is, in reality, a complex of more fundamental
wrongs.... [The individual's interest in privacy itself, however real, is derivative and a
state better vouchsafed by protecting more immediate rights."); see also Judith J. Thomson,
The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295, 313 (1975) (arguing that the right to
privacy is derivative because any claimed violation of privacy can be explained in terms of
some other right without resorting to a notion of privacy).
61 Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAW& CONTMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966).
62 Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity. An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 1003 (1964).
63 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J 421,455 (1980).
64 See, e.g., Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NOMOS
XI]I. PRIVACY 1-26 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds. 1971) (autonomy);
Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.. 475 (1968) (love, friendship, and trust); Robert B.
Hallborg, Jr., Principles of Liberty and the Right to Privacy, 5 LAW & PHIL. 175 (1986)
(liberty).
65 Kalven, supra note 61, at 328.
66 See Gonzalez v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977).67 See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905).
68 See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
69 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
70 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71 See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
72 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
73 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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courts have found the Fourth Amendment to protect an individual's
"reasonable expectation of privacy" not only from physical intrusions into
one's home or office,74 but also from intrusion by various monitoring devices,
such as eavesdropping equipment and electronic tracking devices. 75
Faced with this vast array of cases, some commentators conclude that the
concept of privacy has taken in so much that it collapses of its own weight. In
their view, there is no core, essential meaning of "privacy." Instead, the term
refers to a collection of loosely related but distinct interests. Rather than being
a useful concept, "privacy" clouds our understanding by obscuring the true
underlying interests at stake. We would do better, these reductionists argue, to
identify explicitly and protect directly the more fundamental interests that
underlie the diverse claims of privacy.76
Other writers vigorously reject the reductionist approach, asserting that
privacy is a fundamental right, decisively at stake in most, if not all, the
reported cases. In order to save privacy as a legal concept, they offer
definitions identifying the unique, irreducible interests it protects. Some invoke
broad principles of individuality, personality, and human dignity.77 Such
efforts, however, remain vulnerable to the reductionists' charge that the
concept of privacy is so vague as to have no fixed meaning. Other writers,
recognizing this problem, but equally determined to defend the fundamental
importance of privacy, propose more limited definitions in order to identify
74 See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (private dwelling); Mancusi
v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968) (office).
75 See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (use of eavesdropping device); United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (use of electronic tracking device).
76 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 60, at 20; Kalven, supra note 61, at 327 ("[Pirivacy
seems a less precise way of approaching more specific values, as, for example, in the case
of freedom of speech, association, and religion[.]"); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL.
L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) ("The law of privacy comprises four distinct kinds of invasion of
four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but
otherwise have almost nothing in common.... ."); Thomson, supra note 60, at 313 ("[I]t is
possible to explain in the case of each right in the cluster how come we have it without ever
once mentioning the right to privacy."); Raymond Wacks, Introduction, in PRIVACY I, at xii
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1993) ("The concept of 'privacy' has become too vague and
unwieldy a concept to perform useful analytical work."); Raymond Wacks, The Poverty of
'Privacy,' 96 LAW Q. REv. 73, 88 (1980) (The concept of privacy is so "attenuated,
confused and overworked" it seems "beyond redemption."); Diane L. Zimmerman,
Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68
CORNELL L. REv. 291, 299 (1983) ("[A]s a descriptive or analytic term, 'right to privacy' is
virtually meaningless.").
77 See, e.g., Bloustein, supra note 62, at 1002-06; Paul A. Freund, Privacy: One
Concept or Many, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra note 64, at 182-98.
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when a loss of privacy is threatened. Some have focused on an individual's
control over the flow of personal information. 78 Others have emphasized
restricting accessibility to the individual. 79 Still others have defined privacy in
terms of personal autonomy.80 Despite these many efforts, no widely accepted,
78 See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) ("Privacy is the claim
of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others."); Elizabeth L. Beardsley,
Privacy: Autonomy and Selective Disclosure, in NOMOS XIII: PRIVACY, supra note 64, at
56-70 (arguing privacy involves the right of selective disclosure of information about one's
self); Fried, supra note 64, at 482 ("Privacy... is the control we have over information
about ourselves." (emphasis in original)).
Some scholars have attempted to avoid any normative cast to the concept of privacy by
rejecting the focus on control and defining it instead as a discernible condition. For
example, privacy has been defined as "the condition of not having undocumented personal
information about oneself known by others," W.A. Parent, A New Definition of Privacy for
the Law, 2 LAW & PHL. 305, 306 (1983), and "the condition of human life in which
acquaintance with a person or with affairs of his life which are personal to him is limited."
Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34, 36 (1967) (emphasis
removed). Where this approach is taken, a further step is needed to give content to a "right"
of privacy. See, e.g., Parent, supra, at 309-12.
79 See, e.g., Richard B. Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 275
(1974). Parker defines privacy as "control over when and by whom the various parts of us
can be sensed by others." Id. at 281 (emphasis in original). Although Parker shares with
Westin and Fried the belief that an important aspect of privacy relates to individual control,
he argues that their focus on control over information is both overly broad and too narrow.
See id. at 279-80. Rather, Parker.argues that privacy and control over personal information
are related in this way: we use our privacy to protect personal information and, conversely,
the dissemination of personal information makes one's privacy both less valuable and less
secure. See id. at 284-85.
Gavison relates these concepts of physical accessibility and control over information in
a somewhat more complex definition of privacy, arguing that privacy is composed of the
three distinct, but interrelated elements of secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. See Gavison,
supra note 63, at 428. Privacy may be lost as others obtain information about, pay attention
to, or gain physical access to an individual. See id.
80 See Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 233, 236
(1977) (Privacy is "an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal
identity.... [Whatever its sources of derivation and protection, [it] is but one concept-
and is thus definable."). Others who speak of the right of privacy in terms of "autonomy"
come closer to the reductionist position that "privacy"-at least as used in many recent
constitutional cases-may be more precisely identified as synonymous with "autonomy"
rather than protecting a distinct but related interest. See Joel Feinberg, Autonomy,
Sovereignty, and Privacy: Moral Ideals in the Constitution?, 58 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 445,
446-57 (1983); Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1424-29
(1974). Rubenfeld takes a different approach in relating the constitutional right of privacy to
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authoritative definition of privacy has emerged.81
In discussing employee privacy rights, I intend to sidestep the definitional
controversies which have plagued general discussions of privacy. I leave aside
here the debates over whether "privacy" has any conceptual coherence,
whether it is one right or many, and whether it is independent or derivative of
more fundamental rights. While these are important philosophical issues,
concrete questions about how far protection for employee privacy ought to
extend in the face of employer authority cannot and need not await their
resolution. Rather than searching for some global definition of privacy which
can explain all of the cases decided in its name, I focus instead on the legal
doctrine on which the private sector employee must rely for protection-the
common law tort of invasion of privacy. By doing so, I do not intend to say
anything universal about the nature of privacy rights in all contexts, nor to
contest the validity of other types of claims traditionally made under the rubric
of privacy, such as the right to make decisions regarding procreation or family
relationships free from government interference. A formal definition of privacy
is unnecessary here, because I am not so much concerned with the precise
boundaries of what is or should be considered private, as with how certain
matters that are considered private in our society generally should be treated in
autonomy interests, arguing that privacy is concerned not so much with prohibiting state
interference with certain "fundamental" activities, as with preventing a law's affirmative
effects when it threatens to determine the course of an individual's life. See led Rubenfeld,
The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 740 (1989).
81 Part of the reason no authoritative definition of privacy has emerged is that
commentators tend to focus only on those cases which illustrate their particular concerns
and to disregard the rest. For example, writers concerned about access to personal
information dismiss the constitutional autonomy cases as not involving "true" privacy
interests. See, e.g., Gavison, supra note 63, at 436; Gross, supra note 78, at 38; Parent,
supra note 78, at 312-22. Others who focus on the right of privacy in making certain
fundamental decisions, such as those relating to procreation, ignore the common law and
Fourth Amendment cases. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 80, at 740. To the extent that
they are describing different sets of data, it should not be surprising that there is no
convergence on any single definition of privacy. In a similar manner, I focus in this Article
on the legal doctrines which have the greatest relevance to the issue of workplace privacy-
primarily the common law tort of intrusion on seclusion and, to a lesser extent, the Fourth
Amendment test of "reasonable expectations of privacy." The reductionists very well may
be right that no single definition or concept is capable of explaining all of the legal cases
actually decided in the name of privacy. However, it does not necessarily follow that it
ceases to be useful to speak of privacy. It is possible that privacy as a legal concept should
only be applied to certain types of cases, or that privacy is best understood not as a single
right, but a cluster of related rights. I do not and need not resolve any of these questions in
this Article.
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the employment setting. By examining the common law privacy tort and its
legal structure, I hope to illuminate the role that privacy norms play in our
social life and the reasons they are sometimes enforced by law, in order to
determine how they should be applied to the employment relationship.
Ill. THE COMMON LAW TORT
The common law tort of invasion of privacy is generally understood to
apply in four distinct but related situations. The right of privacy may be
invaded by (a) "unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another"; (b)
"appropriation of the other's name or likeness"; (c) "unreasonable publicity
given to the other's private life"; or (d) "publicity that unreasonably places the
other in a false light before the public."82 This typology derives from William
Prosser's 1960 article, Privacy, in which he argued that the tort encompasses
four distinct interests with little in common but their name.83 Other scholars,
most notably Edward Bloustein, strongly disagreed, asserting that a single
important interest-the protection of human individuality and dignity-
underlies the broad range of cases brought under the doctrine. 84 Whether or
not Bloustein was right, Prosser's division of the tort into four parts has
become enshrined in the law. Since their adoption in the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, the four types of privacy tort have developed sufficiently
independently that each may be discussed as a distinct cause of action.85
My focus here is on the first type, because the privacy issues typically
raised in the workplace-for example, concerns about personal searches,
electronic surveillance, and invasive testing procedures-are most readily
analyzed as "intrusions on seclusion." Claims based on the appropriation,
publicity, and false light torts may also be alleged against employers, but they
82 RSTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
83 Prosser, supra note 76, at 389.
84 See Bloustein, supra note 62, at 1000-03.
85 The four forms of invasion of privacy set forth in the Restatement are "the ones that
[had] clearly become crystallized and generally been held to be actionable" at that time.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 625A, cmt. c (1977). Comment c to section 652A
specifically states that "[niothing in this Chapter is intended to exclude the possibility of
future developments in the tort law of privacy." Id. In particular, it mentions the possibility
that privacy concerns related to "various types of governmental interference" and "the
compilation of elaborate written or computerized dossiers" may lead to expansion of the
four forms of the invasion of privacy tort or the establishment of new forms. Id.
Nevertheless, the Restatement listing of four types of invasion of privacy has had an
inhibiting effect on the development of the tort. Courts considering claims of tortious
invasion of privacy almost invariably recite the four Restatement categories and base their
judgments on the fit between the facts before them and the existing forms of the tort.
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are generally analyzed in the same manner as like claims arising outside the
employment context86 and therefore, I will not consider them in detail here.
Whether or not an alleged intrusion is "unreasonable," however, depends to a
large extent on the context in which it occurs. In the next section, I explore
how the existence of an employment relationship might affect the
reasonableness of certain intrusions by the employer, but first I examine here
the structure and meaning of the common law tort of "intrusion on seclusion"
more generally.
The paradigm intrusion case occurs when someone enters a private space,
such as a person's home, hotel room, or hospital room without permission.8 7
Unlawful intrusions, however, need not be physical; what the common law tort
seeks to protect is not merely physical space, but an individual's "private
affairs or concerns." 88 Thus, it not only prohibits traditional forms of spying,
such as using binoculars to peer into the windows of a home,8 9 but extends
protection to private activities and conversations9" and certain types of sensitive
information as well. 91
In order to be actionable, the intrusion must be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person. "92 On one level, this element of the tort protects defendants
86 See, e.g., Young v. Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Miss. 1990) (employee alleges public
disclosure of private facts); Diamond Shamrock Refining v. Mendez, 809 S.W.2d 514
(rex. Ct. App. 1991) (employee alleges false light tort), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 844
S.W.2d 198 (rex. 1992); Staruski v. Continental Tel. Co., 581 A.2d 266 (Vt. 1990)
(employee claim based on appropriation of name and likeness). Because qualified privilege
is generally recognized as an affirmative defense to the publicity and false light torts, the
employment context may be relevant in evaluating a defendant employer's claim that its
communications were privileged. However, the initial analysis of an employee's affirmative
claim for tortious invasion of privacy of these two types against her employer does not
differ materially from such claims made in other contexts.
87 See, e.g., Noble v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 109 Cal. Rptr. 269 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973) (hospital room); Byfield v. Candler, 125 S.E. 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924)
(stateroom on ship); Gonzalez v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219 (rex. Civ.
App. 1977) (home).
88 RESTATEMIr (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652B (1977).
89 See Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, 88 So. 2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956). Unjustified
use of viewing devices in traditionally private places like a public restroom or dressing
room may also give rise to liability. See Doe by Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945
F.2d 1422 (8th Cir. 1991); Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
90 See LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 201 N.E.2d 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963); Roach
v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d 564 (W. Va. 1958).
91 See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705 (Ala. 1983)
(sexual information).
92 RSTAT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65213 (1977).
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from the claims of the "neurotically thin-skinned" 93 by imposing an objective
standard. But the requirement of "offensiveness" operates on another level as
well, as a reference to community norms. Robert Post has developed
extensively this link between the common law privacy tort and the observance
of social norms. 94 He points out that the "reasonable person" is an abstraction,
an analytical device created to embody "'the general level of moral judgment of
the community.'" 95 Not simply an empirical or statistical "average" of the
beliefs or experiences of people in the community, the reasonable person is "a
genuine instantiation of community norms." 96 By requiring a plaintiff to show
that a particular intrusion was "highly offensive to a reasonable person," the
law identifies and enforces "those social norms whose violation would
appropriately cause affront or outrage." 97
To explain why the common law is concerned with maintaining certain
social norms, Post turns to the sociological literature. In particular, he relies on
Erving Gofftnan's account of rules of deference and demeanor98 which
regulate, respectively, one's recognition of others and presentation of self.
These rules of deference and demeanor, or "civility rules" as Post calls them,
establish the individual's position in the community. Recognition of one's
unique self cannot be achieved by the individual alone, but is "a product of
joint ceremonial labor"-"a chain of ceremony" with each giving to, and
receiving in turn deference from, others.99 It is in this sense that individual
personality may be understood as constituted by the observance of civility rules
by others.
Although other common law doctrines are also concerned with maintaining
basic "civility rules,"' 0 the privacy tort is particularly concerned with those
93 Roach, 105 S.E.2d at 566.
94 See Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Puivacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957 (1989).
95 Id. at 961 (citing 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmEs, THE LAW OFTORTS § 16.2 (1956)).
96 ld.
97 1d. at 962.
98 Rules of deference define conduct by which a person conveys appreciation "to
a recipient or of this recipient, or of something of which this recipient is taken as a
symbol, extension, or agent." Rules of demeanor define conduct by which a
person expresses "to those in his immediate presence that he is a person of certain
desirable or undesirable qualities."
Id. (quoting E. GOFFMAN, The Nature of Deference and Demeanor, in INTERACroN
RrrUAL: ESSAYS ON FACE-To-FAcEBEHAVIOR 56, 77 (1967)).
99 Id. at 963.
100 Obvious examples are the common law actions for defamation and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
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norms which regulate personal boundaries. The sociological concept of
"territories of the self" 10 1 roughly captures this concern. A territory is "a field
of things" or "a preserve" over which the individual claims a right to control
access or use.102 The prototypical preserve is a fixed space, but the notion of a
territory may also extend to the body, one's personal effects, certain types of
information, and communications with limited others. 103 By respecting the
boundaries of these territorial preserves, the society acknowledges and affirms
the existence of the individual. Thus, as Reiman writes:
Privacy is a social ritual by means of which an individual's moral title to his
existence is conferred. Privacy is an essential part of the complex social
practice by means of which the social group recognizes-and communicates to
the individual-that his existence is his own. 1 0 4
Of course, not every violation of privacy norms warrants legal
intervention. Some intrusions are so trivial that they will be experienced by
most people as mere annoyances or rudeness. The intensity of social life
inevitably results in frequent minor territorial offenses. These breaches of
social norms are easily repaired through ritual interchanges-a simple apology
is the most obvious example-which are designed to affirm the norm violated
and to vindicate the victim's claim to basic forms of respect.105 The common
101 ERVING GOFMAN, The Tenitories of the Self, in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC 28-61
(1971). Goffman's essay is primarily concerned with the study of face-to-face interactions
and the territorial claims of the individual which structure social organization in that
context. In writing about privacy, I mean to indicate territorial claims which operate in a
broader sense-not only against other individuals but also against organized entities,
including governmental and corporate actors. Although this broader understanding of
territorial claims goes beyond Goffman's original focus, the fact that these organizational
entities typically must act through an agent makes the difference less significant than it
might at first seem. In any case, Goffinan's concept of "territorial preserves" provides a
useful starting point in understanding the nature of the claims underlying the privacy tort.
102 Id. at 28-29.
103 See id. at 30-41.
104 Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26,
39 (1976).
105 In an essay entitled Remedial Interchanges, Goffman describes the corrective
process which occurs in response to the inevitable minor breaches of the social order:
mhe complete cycle of crime, apprehension, trial, punishment, and return to society
can run its course in two gestures and a glance. Justice is summary. The
individual... must be prepared to do penance and provide reparations on the spot in
exchange for being accepted back into good graces a moment later.... [S]ince
interactional offenses pertain mainly to claims regarding territories of the self, and since
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law, however, is only concerned with the most serious of these territorial
violations, 1°6 those which threaten an individual's identity by withdrawing the
deference normally afforded a member of the community. By limiting
actionable intrusions to those which would "cause mental suffering, shame or
humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities" 10 7 the common law steps in
only when a violation "potentially places the plaintiff outside of the bounds of
the shared community." 108 In such a situation, the common law tort serves as a
vindication for the plaintiff, a reaffirmation of her status as a member of the
community.
The significance of a loss of privacy is highlighted by what Goffman calls
"total institutions"-places where "all aspects of life are conducted in the same
place and under the same single authority." 109 In the total institution-for
example, a prison or mental hospital-the inmates are placed outside the
bounds of the general community because of their criminal or deviant acts.
Their marginal status is emphasized by the extreme loss of privacy
characteristic of these places:
[Bleginning with admission a kind of contaminative exposure occurs. On the
outside, the individual can hold objects of self-feeling-such as his body, his
immediate actions, his thoughts, and some of his possessions-clear of contact
with alien and contaminating things. But in total institutions these territories of
the self are violated; the boundary that the individual places between his being
and the environment is invaded and the embodiments of self profaned. 110
these claims amount to expectations regarding forms of respect, remedies will be ritual,
that is designed to portray the remorseful attitude of the offender to an offended object
of ultimate value.
ERviNG GOFFMAN, Remedial Interchanges, in RELATIONS IN PUBLIC, supra note 101, at 107
(footnote omitted). Although Goffman's primary focus is on the role these rituals play in
maintaining social control-that is, deterring further infractions of social norms-the privacy
tort is concerned, in egregious cases, with redressing the harm to the individual suffering
the violation as well.
106 Post points out that the common law's limited focus on only the most egregious
offenses is essential to prevent a flood of trivial lawsuits, as well as to preserve the flexibility
and vitality of social life. See Post, supra note 94, at 975.
107 Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 859 (rex. 1973).
108 Post, supra note 94, at 968.
109 ERviNG GOFFMAN, AsYLuMS 6 (1961).
110 Id. at 23. Goffinan catalogs the invasions: facts about the individual's social status
and past behavior-especially discreditable facts-are collected, recorded, and made
available to staff; physical possessions are examined, catalogued, and taken away; the
individual's physical person is searched, photographed, weighed, and fingerprinted. See id.
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By disrupting or defiling "precisely those actions that in civil society have the
role of attesting to the actor and those in his presence that he has some
command over his world,"' the procedures of the total institution
communicate to the inmates that they are set apart from the rest of society.
Understanding the privacy tort as safeguarding "civility rules" helps to
explain certain aspects of its legal structure. 112 From its first articulation by
Warren and Brandeis, the common law right of privacy has been linked to the
principle of "an inviolate personality." 113 This link becomes explicable once it
is recognized that the common law tort is concerned with maintaining basic
forms of respect for the individual. Because the observance of fundamental
social norms by others is a crucial constituent of individual personality,
violation of these norms is itself harmful, independent of any measurable
damages. Therefore, the common law does not require the plaintiff to prove
any physical injury, 114 or consequential harm from an invasion of privacy in
order to recover. Indeed, a defendant may be liable for an invasion of privacy
even when the plaintiff cannot prove that she was actually observed, or that any
private information was obtained, because the intrusion itself is wrongful. 15
According to the Restatement, a plaintiff is entitled to damages for "the harm
to his interest in privacy resulting from the invasion" in addition to recovery
at 16-24. Further losses of privacy result from collective sleeping and bathing
arrangements, doorless toilets, and constant surveillance. See id. at 24-25.
111 Id. at 43.
1 12 Post, supra note 94, at 964-65.
113 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 50, at 205. Courts have described the common law
privacy tort in similar terms, as protecting one's "psychological solitude" and "inviolate
personality." See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 710
(Ala. 1983); Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386, 1388 (La. 1979).
1 14 See K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (noting
intrusion itself is actionable even without physical detriment); Roach v. Harper, 105 S.E.2d
564, 568 (W. Va. 1958) (finding no allegation of special damages necessary; invasion itself
gives right to recover).
115 See Doe by Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir.
1991) (finding surreptitious videotaping of private dressing room actionable even without
proof that plaintiffs were actually viewed in a state of undress); Phillips, 435 So. 2d at 709
(finding information about plaintiff's private activities need not actually be acquired before
cause of action for invasion of privacy is established); Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (finding installation of hidden viewing device in women's restroom
constitutes highly offensive interference with privacy, regardless of whether plaintiffs can
prove they were actually viewed in restroom); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242
(N.H. 1964) (upholding cause of action for invasion of privacy for bugging marital
bedroom, even in absence of allegations that anyone actually listened or overheard
anything).
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for any mental distress or special damages.1 16 This provision for relief
independent of any consequential harm can be understood as redressing
"dignitary harm," in the same way that general damages are available for
defamation regardless of whether there is proof of actual injury.117 An invasion
of privacy, then, is intrinsically harmful because it entails the denial of basic
forms of respect accorded members of the community.118
This understanding of the common law tort rests on a conception of
privacy that is both highly normative and unavoidably contextual. Rather than
neutrally describing an observable state of affairs, privacy is concerned with the
meaning of human interactions. Characterizing those interactions-as
reasonable and appropriate or unjustified and invasive-is impossible without
reference to community norms and expectations. Again, this contextual aspect
of privacy norms is reflected in the structure of the common law privacy tort,
which only protects matters which are "entitled to be... private." 119 Thus,
individuals observed or photographed while on a public street or outside their
homes have no claim for invasion of privacy. 120 Nor can they complain when
someone examines information about them contained in public records. 121 The
objective fact of observation or information gathering alone is not tortious.
Rather, an interest in privacy is legally protectible only where an "actual
expectation of seclusion or solitude" exists and "that expectation [is]
objectively reasonable.' 122 Like the Fourth Amendment inquiry into whether
an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, 123 the common law tort
looks to societal understandings and community norms to determine the
legitimacy of an individual's claim to privacy.
Because the significance of an alleged intrusion can only be determined in
reference to the norms of a particular community, concepts of privacy are
necessarily culturally contingent.' 24 Areas felt to be intrinsically private are
116 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652H (1977).
1 17 See KnnTON Er A., supra note 53, § 116A, at 843.
118 See Post, supra note 94, at 964.
119 KEErONErr AL., supra note 53, § 117, at 855.
120 See Johnson v. Corporate Special Servs., Inc., 602 So. 2d 385, 388 (Ala. 1992);
Nader v. General Motors Corp., 255 N.E.2d 765, 771 (N.Y. 1970); McLain v. Boise
Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 346 (Or. 1975).
121 See RESTATE MNT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 652B cmt. c (1977).
122 People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d
1269, 1279 (Nev. 1995) (citing M & R Investment Co. v. Mandarino, 748 P.2d 488, 493
(1987)).
123 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
124 Given the culturally contingent nature of privacy norms, it should not be surprising
that their precise scope is not easily defined. Because privacy norms do not exist in any
fixed, objective sense, but only as a matter of evolving social beliefs and practices, their
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merely matters of convention when examined from a cross-cultural perspective.
For example, Western cultural attitudes toward human nakedness differ
markedly from those of many aboriginal cultures and have shifted considerably
over time. Nevertheless, a concern with bodily privacy cannot therefore be
dismissed as trivial. Because each individual is situated in a particular society,
her standing in that community is delineated by its cultural norms.125 Violation
of those norms, though perhaps inflicting only a symbolic harm, will
nevertheless be experienced as profoundly demeaning and degrading. 126
The recognition that privacy norms are contextually determined introduces
a further complication. Because privacy is concerned with the "characterization
of human action," it is not only culturally contingent, but relationally
contingent as well, for the meaning of an apparent encroachment on the
"territories of the self" turns on the social relationship between the parties. The
same act which is perfectly appropriate in one context, may constitute a serious
territorial offense if the relationship of the parties is different. As Goffinan
writes,
[Tihe very forms of behavior employed to celebrate and affirm relationships-
rituals such as greetings, enquiries after health, and love-making--are very
close in character to what would be a violation of preserves if performed
between wrongly related individuals. 127
This observation should not be surprising, for the very existence of social
bonds between individuals entails the removal or lowering of the barriers that
content is not easily reduced to abstract principle. Disagreements about the definition of
privacy are, in a sense, struggles over what the content of those norms should be.
125 In order to evaluate a claim of invasion of privacy, then, it is first necessary to
determine which is the relevant community whose cultural norms should be applied.
Although in many contexts such an inquiry will be relatively straightforward, cultural norms
regarding certain aspects of privacy may vary widely even within a particular society. The
existence of distinct cultural subgroups defined along ethnic, religious, socio-economic, or
generational lines will invariably result in divergent norms. In a culturally diverse society
such as the United States, there is always the danger that "the civility rules enforced by a
particular court may be understood as hegemonically imposed by one dominant culture
group onto others." Post, supra note 94, at 977.
126 The symbolic aspect of privacy norms does not diminish their importance. Rather,
areas designated as private are "highly significant as expressions of respect for others."
Fried, supra note 64, at 489. This significance is most apparent when these norms are
violated: "Not only does a person feel his standing is gravely compromised by such
symbolic violations, but also those who wish to degrade and humiliate others often choose
just such symbolic aggressions and invasions on the assumed though conventional area of
privacy." Id.
127 GOFF'MAN, supra note 101, at 57-58.
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ordinarily separate people.
The territories of the self thus have a dual significance: by asserting these
boundaries, the individual demands recognition by the general community; by
relinquishing those claims, she permits and expresses the existence of close
social bonds with certain others. Personal boundaries can only function in this
dual way, however, if the individual retains control over access to the relevant
territories. It is in this sense that the "preserves of the self" are linked to
"selfhiood." The critical issue is not so much whether an individual's territorial
boundaries are breached, but whether the individual is granted a sufficiently
autonomous role in permitting or denying access to her territorial preserves. 128
A legal right of privacy, by enforcing the individual's exclusive claim to
territories of the self, is thus a means of guaranteeing to the individual the self-
determination which permits her simultaneously to achieve connection with
others and demand respect from her community. Such an understanding is
implicit in Fried's argument that privacy, which he defines as control over
knowledge about oneself, is the necessary context for relationships of love,
friendship, and trust. By granting title to information about oneself, "privacy
creates the moral capital which we spend in friendship and love." 129
From this perspective, many of the debates over what should properly be
considered private can be understood as struggles over the appropriate
boundaries of the territories of the self. In arguing that information about our
spending habits, or our medical histories, or our electronic communications
ought or ought not be considered private, we are essentially arguing about the
closeness of the link between these aspects of individual life and the self. These
debates are particularly difficult because they involve choices between contested
cultural meanings. From a sociological perspective, however, the outcome of
these struggles-where the precise boundaries are ultimately determined to be-
is less important than the fact that some such boundaries are recognized. Put
another way, the significance of the territories of the self lies in the necessary
space they provide for individual flourishing: it is only by recognizing and
128 As Goffman writes,
mhe issue is not whether a preserve is exclusively maintained, or shared, or given up
entirely, but rather the role the individual is allowed in determining what happens to his
claim .... Thus, on the issue of will and self-determination turns the whole possibility
of using territories of the self in a dual way, with comings-into-touch avoided as a
means of maintaining respect and engaged in as a means of establishing regard.
Id. at 60-61. Alan Westin and others similarly emphasize the centrality of individual control
in any conception of privacy. See supra note 78.
129 Fried, supra note 64, at 484.
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protecting such a space that the individual is empowered both to assert her
standing as an individual within her community, as well as to form and
maintain close bonds with others.
This dual function of territorial preserves has some important implications
for understanding privacy violations. Generally, an intrusion is understood to
occur when someone intrudes on an area "to which he has no right of
access."130 As against the stranger, the individual has the broadest possible
claims; the stranger has no right to enter any of the areas traditionally
designated as private in that society. However, because every social bond
involves some waiver of territorial claims, the relevant boundaries change as
the relationship between the parties changes. Once a social relationship is
entered into, one party may have legitimate right of access to aspects of
another's life which would otherwise be shielded by privacy. The individual's
waiver of territorial claims, however, is not unlimited; it extends only to those
areas which must be shared to accomplish the purposes of the relationship. 13 1
Those needs, carving out areas of legitimate access from background social
norms regarding personal privacy, establish the relevant boundaries for that
particular relationship. A violation of privacy, then, occurs when an actor
intrudes on an area beyond what is warranted by the existing social relationship
between the parties.
In addition to an intrusion, a violation of privacy involves an element of
loss of control over access to one's territorial preserves. The degree of this loss
of control affects the significance of a given intrusion. For example, the
passerby who lingers by a bedroom window in order to overhear private
conversations can be easily shut out by closing the window, while the
surreptitious use of a listening device to acquire the same information warrants
legal action. 132 The worst violations occur when the individual is systematically
deprived of control over her territorial preserves through the exercise of power
by another. 133 Power may be used to intrude directly, or to force another to
130 GOFRMAN, supra note 101, at 50 (emphasis added).
131 Not all relationships are necessarily sought in order to achieve ends outside the
relationship itself. Complete friendship, in the Aristotelian sense, values another for the
friend's own self, apart from any utility or pleasure that may be derived from the
relationship. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs, 211-13 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985).
Friendship of this sort likely entails a more complete waiver of one's territorial claims than
is required to enter into other, more utilitarian relationships. Nevertheless, the crucial aspect
remains the role of individual will in that waiver; true friendship can never be coerced.
132 See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964).
133 Traditionally, the primary concern has been with the threat to individual privacy
and security posed by expansive state power. Such concerns are reflected in the First,
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. More recently, however,
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expose aspects of herself to others. In extreme cases, it may be the individual's
own actions which constitute the territorial breach, and yet she is understood
not to be the source of the violation herself.134 An example is the prisoner who
is forced to undress in order to undergo a strip search.135 Although the
individual's own acts breach the territorial boundaries, the source of the breach
is understood to be located elsewhere; through the exercise of power by
another, the individual, in a sense, has become the agent of her own violation.
IV. PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT
Given that privacy norms are both culturally and relationally contingent,
the legitimacy of employee claims to privacy must be determined by reference
to both general social understandings regarding personal privacy as well as the
nature and purposes of the employment relationship. When the parties enter
into an employment relationship, they do so against an extensive backdrop of
informal social norms, including those which regulate personal boundaries.
Although those background social norms are undoubtedly affected by the
existence of the employment relationship, I argue here that employees
nevertheless retain certain legitimate expectations of privacy even in the
workplace context.
Outside the employment relationship, the individual ordinarily has a claim
to certain socially defined territorial preserves. She is entitled to expect that
others will observe and respect the boundaries of the territories of the self.
Enforcement of these boundaries is primarily accomplished by an extensive
system of informal sanctions, but they are backed by legal authority as well in
cases of egregious violation. Thus, the common law prohibits "highly
offensive" intrusions by third parties on matters an individual is entitled to keep
private, and the Constitution provides roughly analogous protection against
intrusions by the government. When legal authority is invoked, the issue is
often framed in terms of whether the individual had a "reasonable expectation
of privacy" in the area or matter intruded upon. 136
technological advances potentially place enormous power in the hands of nongovernmental
actors to effect similar invasions of individual privacy. See sources cited supra notes 12-14.
134 See GOFFMAN, supra note 101, at 56.
135 See id.
136 The protections of the Fourth Amendment come into play only where government
action threatens an individual's "'reasonable expectations of privacy.'" Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (-arlan, J.,
concurring)). Similarly, the common law tort of invasion of privacy requires that the matter
intruded upon "be entitled to be... private." KEETON E" AL., supra note 53, § 117, at 855;
see also, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Berosini, 895 P.2d 1269, 1279
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Determining when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy is
a highly complex inquiry. As the Supreme Court has recognized, there is "no
talisman that determines in all cases those privacy expectations that society is
prepared to accept as reasonable." 137 Instead, courts must look to a variety of
factors, including actual practices and societal understandings. 138 But this
inquiry is more complicated than the Court acknowledges, for societal
expectations do not exist independently of legal rules. Although the law
purports to take its guidance from societal understandings, those
understandings are in turn shaped by legal doctrine. Particularly when the
social meaning of a given practice is contested, legal recognition or
nonrecognition of an expectation of privacy will drive social norms in one
(Nev. 1995) (citing M & R Investment Co. v. Mandarino, 748 P.2d 488, 493 (Nev. 1987))
(noting expectation of seclusion or solitude must be objectively reasonable); K-Mart Corp.
v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (finding plaintiff "demonstrated a
legitimate expectation to a right of privacy" by placing lock on workplace locker).
The Fourth Amendment threshold test has sometimes been treated as a two-pronged
inquiry, asking first, whether the individual "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy" and second, whether that expectation is "one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.'" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (-arlan, I., concurring). The subjective prong has
been much criticized. Commentators have argued that a purely subjective test of an
individual's expectations of privacy is "nonsensical," Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism,
Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment 77teery, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 250
(1993), and that it "has no place... in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects."
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REV. 349,
384 (1974). Although the Supreme Court has apparently recognized some of the problems
with using a subjective test, see, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5
(1979), it has never explicitly repudiated it, and its role in determining the outcome in
Fourth Amendment cases is somewhat unclear. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIzuRE § 2.1(c) (2d ed. 1987).
The requirement under the common law tort of invasion of privacy that the matter
intruded upon actually be private is not an exact parallel of the subjective prong of the
Fourth Amendment test. Rather than looking at subjective understandings, the common law
simply requires that "the plaintiff in an invasion of privacy case must have conducted
himself or herself in a manner consistent with an actual expectation of privacy, i.e., he or
she must not have manifested by his or her conduct a voluntary consent to the invasive
actions of defendant." Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 648 (Cal. 1994).
137 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (plurality opinion).
138 In determining what expectations of privacy are reasonable, "'the Court has given
weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, the uses to
which the individual has put a location, and our societal understanding that certain areas
deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.'" Id. (quoting Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
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direction or another. 139 A full exploration of the interaction between legal rules
and social norms, and the proper role of law in shaping privacy expectations is
beyond the scope of this Article. While I believe that current doctrine is likely
to be insufficiently protective of important privacy interests, I make a more
limited claim here: whatever the exact contours of privacy expectations are or
should be in general, those expectations are not wholly negated by the existence
of the employment relationship.
Outside the employment context it is possible to identify certain core areas
of privacy which are recognized in this society. Although the proper scope of
privacy protection is controversial in many areas, certain aspects of individual
life are consistently acknowledged to be private in a broad variety of contexts.
For example, both the common law and constitutional cases acknowledge that
strong interests in privacy shield the individual's body and bodily functions
from examination absent some justifying circumstance. 140 Certain types of
personal information relating to health and sexual matters have also frequently
139 For example, the issue of whether communications sent by electronic mail should
be regarded as private is today unsettled and highly controversial. See United States v.
Maxwell, 42 MJ. 568, 576 (A.F.C.C.A. 1995) (finding an expectation of privacy in
electronic communications only as long as the communications are stored in the computer,
but not if downloaded or removed from the on-line service); S. REP. No. 99-541, at 4
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3558 (Department of Justice letter to
Senator Leahy stating that when a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in electronic
communications is "not always clear or obvious."). In addressing legal disputes regarding
the privacy of electronic mail, courts may attempt to reflect nascent understandings of this
new technology, but their rulings will themselves become a dominant factor in shaping
privacy expectations in the future. In determining that electronic mail communications are
or are not private, courts will not so much be making a factual assessment of its nature-no
consensus currently exists-but a normative choice as to whether these communications
should be protected as private.
A similar dynamic occurs between "actual practices" and "societal understandings."
On the one hand, widely accepted privacy norms will shape actual practices, because
individuals within the community will feel constrained to conform their behavior to those
norms. On the other hand, even strongly held norms may be eroded over time as limited
incursions are first tolerated and then accepted.
140 See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17
(1989) (finding compelled blood tests implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests in
security of one's person; monitoring of act of urination also infringes privacy interests long
recognized by society); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) (finding
Fourth Amendment protection of human dignity and privacy forbids unreasonable searches
involving intrusions beyond the body's surface); Doe by Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc.,
945 F.2d 1422, 1427 (8th Cir. 1991) (videotaping of models in dressing room constitutes
tortious invasion of privacy); Harkey v. Abate, 346 N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983)
(installating of viewing device in women's restroom constitutes tortious invasion of privacy).
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been recognized as private. 141 And both private individuals and government
agents are prohibited from intruding without justification upon the individual's
home, or upon communications traditionally respected as private-such as the
telephone or mails. 142 Personal privacy in these core areas is fundamental, not
necessarily because of their intrinsic value, but because they have been
designated in this society as somehow central to the self.143 Gratuitous
intrusions on these core areas of privacy threaten not only dignitary harm, but
the individual's standing in the community as well. 144
At least in these core areas, individuals are clearly acknowledged to have
141 See, e.g., Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17 (finding blood and urine tests implicate
Fourth Amendment because analysis of bodily fluids can reveal "a host of private medical
facts about an employee"); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (finding state
collection of medical records threatens constitutionally protected interest in nondisclosure of
private information); Glover v. Eastern Nebraska Community Office of Retardation, 867
F.2d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding mandatory blood tests of employees for AIDS virus
violates Fourth Amendment); In re Search Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67, 71 (3d Cir.
1987) (finding medical records are clearly within constitutionally protected sphere); Thorne
v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 470 (9th Cir. 1983) (questioning of applicant for
police officer position about her past sex life violated her constitutional privacy interests).
Allegations by a plaintiff that her employer made repeated inquiries into her sex life
have also been held to state a cause of action for tortious intrusion on seclusion. See Phillips
v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983). Although there do
not appear to be any common law "intrusion on seclusion" cases dealing with unauthorized
access to medical records, personal information contained in medical records is clearly
"private" information protected from public disclosure by the common law tort. See
FINKIN, supra note 16, at 16-18 and cases cited therein.
142 Invasions of an individual's home, telephone conversations, and personal mail by
nongovernmental actors have been found to give rise to a claim for tortious invasion of
privacy. See, e.g., Vernars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir. 1976) (mail); LeCrone v.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 201 N.E.2d 533, 540 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (telephone conversations);
Gonzales v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 555 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977)
(home). Similarly, the Constitution clearly forbids unreasonable intrusions on the home and
private communications. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
353 (1967) (telephone conversation); Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (mail). Of
course, other laws also protect against these types of intrusions in certain circumstances. See
e.g., Title III Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-
2520 (1994).
143 "Convention... designates certain areas, intrinsically no more private than other
areas, as symbolic of the whole institution of privacy, and thus deserving of protection
beyond their particular importance." Fried, supra note 64, at 487. Fried identifies excretory
functions and matters of sex and health as examples of conventionally designated areas of
privacy carrying significant symbolic importance in our culture. See id. at 487-88.144 See supra notes 94-108 and accompanying text.
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rights of privacy against the government and against third parties. How the
individual's expectations of privacy in these core areas are affected when an
intrusion by an employer is threatened depends upon the nature of the
employment relationship. Employment falls at some mid-point on the spectrum
of social relationships. It is characterized neither by the distant formality of a
chance encounter with a stranger, nor by the intimacy found between close
friends or lovers. Employment involves an economic exchange-the employee
trades her labor for wages-but it is also typically an ongoing relationship with
a social as well as an economic dimension. 145 Employer and employee
generally understand themselves to be engaged in a joint effort to achieve some
common end. To that extent, employees must relinquish certain claims they
otherwise might assert against the world at large. A prospective employee is
routinely expected to reveal to the employer basic personal data, as well as
information about her education, experience, and skills that relate to her fitness
to perform a particular job. Once hired, she understands that her work will be
supervised and reviewed to ensure that she is performing adequately. Thus, an
employee must inevitably compromise her broadest territorial claims to achieve
the purposes of the relationship.
On the other hand, employment is not an all-encompassing relationship.
Although some territorial boundaries are necessarily breached to make
employment possible, this implicit waiver of territorial claims does not
automatically extend to those areas recognized to be at the core of personal
privacy. Because employer and employee enter into the relationship for a
specific, limited purpose, any implied waiver only extends as far as necessary
to achieve that purpose. To conclude otherwise would set the employment
relationship apart among social relationships, for the individual who could
expect-and enforce-limits on unjustified intrusions by the government or
third parties on core areas of privacy would have no such expectation vis-a-vis
her employer. Given that the interests at stake are the same regardless of the
source of the intrusion, it would be anomalous to treat the employer's actions
as uniquely privileged. When core areas of privacy-those central to the self-
are threatened, employer intrusions should not be permitted unless essential to
meet some business need.
The conclusion that employees do not lose all ordinary expectations of
privacy merely because they enter into an employment relationship has been
145 This observation is not true of all employment relationships, of course. The
employment experiences of day laborers, for example, usually involve casual, one-time
market exchanges with little or no expectation of an ongoing relationship with an employer.
Similarly, the growth of the temporary personnel industry has significantly altered the




confirmed in a number of legal contexts. Arbitrators interpreting collective
bargaining agreements have held that "an employee does not somehow abandon
his right to privacy at the doorstep of the employer's premises." 146 Merely by
signing on to an employment relationship, an individual does not automatically
open his private life to the scrutiny of the employer. 147 Similarly, courts
applying the common law right of privacy to the workplace have concluded
that employees retain some legitimate expectations of privacy despite the
existence of an employee-employer relationship.148
Further evidence that employees retain at least some socially recognized
interests in privacy can be found in cases involving public employees.
Although those cases are generally decided on constitutional grounds
inapplicable in the private sector, they nevertheless reveal societal
understandings of the nature of the employment relationship. Doctrinal
categories aside, cases dealing with the privacy rights of public employees are
concerned not so much with limits on government when acting in its sovereign
capacity, as with the employee's reasonable expectations of privacy when the
government happens to be the employer. Despite the existence of the
employment relationship, courts have recognized that the "individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters" 149 limits government inquiries into its
employees' prior sexual activities and associations, past drug and alcohol use,
mental health history, and personal financial information.150
146 Trailways, Inc., 88 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1073, 1080 (1987) (Goodman, Arb.).
147 See id.
148 See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 626 (3d Cir. 1992);
Kelley v. Schlumberger Tech. Corp., 849 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1988); O'Brien v. Papa
Gino's of America, Inc., 780 F.2d 1067, 1072 (1st Cir. 1986); Garus v. Rose Acre Farms,
839 F. Supp. 563, 570 (N.D. Ind. 1993); Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 435
So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983); Sowards v. Norbar, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 468, 474-75 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1992); Leggett v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, 739 P.2d 1083, 1086-87 (Or. Ct.
App. 1987); Kjerstad v. Ravellette Publications, Inc., 517 N.W.2d 419, 424 (S.D. 1994);
K-Mart Corp. v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 637 (rex. Ct. App. 1984); Cordle v. General
Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111, 117 (W. Va. 1984); . .uedtke v. Nabors Alaska
Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Alaska 1989) (finding public policy supporting
protection of employee privacy); Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618,
628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (finding California constitutional right of privacy applies in
private sector workplace); Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990)
(same); Bratt v. IBM, 467 N.E.2d 126, 134 (Mass. 1984) (finding Massachusetts right of
privacy statute applies in employment context).
149 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
150 See, e.g., Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468 (9th Cir. 1983) (past
sexual history); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. United States R.R. Retirement Bd.,
742 F. Supp. 450, 455 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (alcohol and drug use); cf Fraternal Order of Police
1996]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNVAL
Cases decided under the Fourth Amendment have explicitly found that
public employees have expectations of privacy "that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable.'"' 151 For example, in O'Connor v. Ortega,152 the
U.S. Supreme Court considered a challenge by Dr. Ortega, a state hospital
employee, to a search of his office, desk, and file cabinets conducted by his
employer. Noting that the "operational realities" of the workplace might make
some employee's expectations of privacy unreasonable when the intrusion was
by a supervisor rather than law enforcement, the Court nevertheless rejected
the Government's argument that its employees could never have a reasonable
expectation of privacy at work. 153 Looking instead to "the societal expectations
of privacy in one's place of work" 154 and the actual practices at the hospital, 155
the Court concluded that Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
desk and file cabinets and possibly his office as well. 156
v. Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1987) (physical and mental condition; financial
information; gambling habits and alcohol use); National Treasury Employees Union v. IRS,
843 F. Supp. 214, 218 (W.D. Tex. 1992) (illegal drug use during past five years), vacated,
25 F.3d 237 (1994).
151 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
152 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
153 Id. at 717. The Court's analysis focused on Ortega's expectation of privacy in the
place of work itself. The Court earlier noted that "[n]ot everything that passes through the
confines of the business address can be considered part of the workplace context." Id. at
716. Where the need for access by supervisors or coworkers does not exist, for example, to
the contents of an employee's closed luggage, handbag, or briefcase, the Court suggests that
a different, and presumably higher, standard would apply. See id.
154 Id. at 717. The Court cited its earlier decisions in Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170 (1984), and Mancasi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968), as recognizing societal
expectations of privacy in one's place of work. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717
(1987).
155 Ortega had occupied the office for 17 years and kept numerous personal materials
there. It was undisputed that he had exclusive use of his desk and file cabinets and that the
hospital had never discouraged him from storing personal items at work. See O'Connor,
480 U.S. at 718-19.
156 All members of the Court agreed that Ortega had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his desk and file cabinets. See id. at 718 (plurality opinion); see id. at 731
(Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 732 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Five of the Justices also
found that Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his office. See id. at 731
(Scalia, J., concurring); see id. at 732, 737-41 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The plurality,
however, would remand the question of Ortega's expectations of privacy in his office
because the factual record did not reveal the extent to which hospital officials may have
entered the office for work-related reasons. See id. at 718.
Because Ortega had a reasonable expectation of privacy at least in his desk and file
cabinets, the Court went on to address the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard to be
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In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,157 the Court again
considered the constitutionality of employer searches under the Fourth
Amendment. Despite its ultimate conclusion that the Government's compelling
interest in railroad safety was decisive, the Skinner Court did recognize that the
mandatory blood and urine tests at issue implicated significant privacy interests
of the affected employees, based on its prior decisions regarding blood tests in
the criminal context, the sensitive nature of the information revealed through
testing, and traditional mores surrounding excretory functions. 158
If employees in fact retain some socially recognized expectations of privacy
vis-a-vis their employers, then some method for determining which claims to
privacy are legitimate is needed. As a first step, courts should look to general
societal understandings to determine what aspects of individual life are shielded
by privacy. Evidence of the relevant social norms may be found not only in
actual practices and societal understandings, but also in privacy cases decided
outside the employment context. Common law cases finding a tortious invasion
of privacy can be examined to identify matters "entitled to be private."
Similarly, cases decided under state constitutions or the U.S. Constitution
provide further evidence of established privacy norms by identifying the core
applied to searches in the workplace. Noting that an employer might frequently need to
enter and search an employee's office for legitimate work-related purposes, the Court
concluded that adherence to the requirements of a warrant and probable cause in the
employment setting was impracticable. Rather, when "noninvestigatory, work-related"
searches or "investigations of work-related misconduct" infringe on protected privacy
interests, the intrusion "should be judged by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances." Id. at 725-26.
157 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
158 See id. at 616-17. Concerning the blood tests, the Court wrote:
In light of our society's concern for the security of one's person, it is obvious that
this physical intrusion, penetrating beneath the skin, infringes an expectation of
privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. The ensuing chemical
analysis of the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the
tested employee's privacy interests.
Id. at 616 (citations omitted). As to the urine tests, the court wrote:
[Clhemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can reveal a host of private
medical facts about an employee, including whether he or she is epileptic,
pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be disputed that the process of collecting the
sample to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural monitoring
of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests.
Id. at 617.
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areas in which individual expectations of privacy are recognized as reasonable.
By looking to constitutional privacy cases, I am not suggesting that the
Constitution does or should apply directly to private employers. My proposal is
a more modest one: that cases decided on constitutional grounds be looked to
as one source of evidence of basic social expectations regarding privacy. Joseph
Grodin and Clyde Summers each have argued that constitutional values should
be brought to bear in the private sector workplace, not so much through the
direct application of constitutional provisions, but by legislative and common
law developments that are sensitive to and protective of basic personal
freedoms such as the right of privacy. 159 Similarly, I argue that constitutional
cases can and should provide experience in identifying those matters socially
recognized to be private when determining the legitimacy of employee claims
to privacy under the common law.
Because privacy norms are relationally contingent, identifying general
societal expectations of privacy are only the first step in assessing the
legitimacy of employee claims to privacy. These ordinary expectations must
then be reassessed and revised in light of the nature and purposes of the
employment relationship. Although, as discussed above, an individual's
expectations of privacy are not negated simply by the fact of employment, they
may be diminished to some extent in light of the specific employer's legitimate
business needs. Certain business needs requiring minor incursions on
individual privacy are commonplace and generally uncontroversial. For
example, employers generally have a legitimate need to inquire into a worker's
educational background, past work experience, and skills. But the more closely
an employer's inquiries or practices trench on interests at the recognized core
of individual privacy, the greater the need for some specific justification.
Generalized assertions of business need should not be sufficient to trump
entirely an employee's socially recognized expectations of privacy. As
discussed above, the waiver of territorial claims required to form the
employment relationship is not an unbounded one; it extends only so far as
necessary to achieve the purposes of that relationship. Each employer intrusion
must be justified, not only in its purpose, but in the extent of its intrusiveness
as well. 160 Thus, even a legitimate employer interest, such as securing its
159 Joseph R. Grodin, Constitutional Values in the Private Sector Workplace, 13
INDUS. REL. L.. 1 (1991); Clyde W. Summers, The Privatization of Personal Freedomr
and Enrichment of Democracy: Some Lessons from Labor Law, 1986 U. ILL. L. Rav. 689
(1986).
160 As the Supreme Court put it in O'Connor, the reasonableness of an intrusion on
employee privacy depends upon both its inception and scope. See 480 U.S. at 726. Even if
a search is justified at its inception by strong work-related reasons, it will be permissible in
scope only when "'the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the
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property, cannot, without more, justify radically invasive measures such as
continual video surveillance of employees in traditionally private places like
restrooms or the interception of purely private phone calls. 161
Of course, the employer's interests vary from workplace to workplace.
One implication of recognizing that privacy norms are relationally contingent is
that the relevant norms depend not only upon the fact of the employment
relationship, but the type of employment relationship as well. The overall
purpose of the business of the employer and the nature of the employee's
specific job are relevant considerations in determining which intrusions violate
socially sanctioned claims of privacy. Thus, a health club which employs
fitness trainers has a legitimate interest in the health status and physical
conditioning of its employees to an extent that the employer of clerical workers
does not. In the first case, their physical condition goes to the core of the
purpose for which the employees were hired; in the second case, it is at best
peripheral. Difficult questions may arise as to the true nature and purpose of
the employment in a given situation and will require a highly fact-specific
inquiry for resolution.
At this point, however, a caveat is necessary. Although privacy norms vary
depending upon context, that variation arises from broad-based social
understandings of the differing nature of the different relationships, not from
the unilateral actions of one party to the relationship. The parties can, of
course, create by agreement a higher expectation of privacy than that
established by general background norms. Thus, for example, an employer
may bind itself through an express contract not to inquire into certain aspects of
an employee's life. 162 In the next section, I address the more difficult question
of whether the parties to an employment relationship can mutually agree that
search and not excessively intrusive in light of... the nature of the [alleged misconduct].'"
Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)). Occasionally, courts seem
to collapse these two considerations and assume that so long as the purpose of the intrusion
is somehow work-related, the employer may use "intrusive and even objectionable means"
to achieve its goals. See, e.g., Baggs v. Eagle-Picher Indus., 957 F.2d 268, 275 (6th Cir.
1992). The net effect of such an approach is to eviscerate any employee claim to privacy,
because an employer will always be able to articulate some broad interest that might be
served by invading its employees' privacy.
161 Such an approach is consistent with common law privacy cases decided in
nonemployment contexts where the mere fact of property ownership is not sufficient to
justify otherwise unreasonable intrusions on privacy. See, e.g., Harkey v. Abate, 346
N.W.2d 74, 76 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (installing viewing device in women's restroom by
owner of skating rink actionable); Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239, 242 (N.H. 1964)
(installing listening device in tenants' bedroom by owner of property gives rise to a claim
for tortious invasion of privacy).162 See Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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the employee will waive her socially established expectations at the core of
personal privacy. Putting aside for the moment the issue of voluntary waiver,
my point here is that the employer cannot defeat these socially recognized
expectations of privacy simply by adopting practices violative of fundamental
privacy norms. 163
This point was articulated by California Supreme Court Justice Kennard in
her partial concurrence in Hill v. NCAA, a case interpreting California's
constitutional right of privacy as applied to private actors:
No association, industry, or other group or entity may establish the parameters
of the reasonable expectation of privacy at the expense of society. For instance,
an employer may not, simply by announcing in advance that all employees will
be subject to periodic strip searches, thereby defeat the employees' otherwise
reasonable expectation that such searches will not occur. Governing social
163 The Supreme Court's opinion in the Skinner case appears somewhat ambiguous on
this point. In concluding that the government's interest in safety outweighed employee
expectations of privacy, the Court noted that railroad employees have diminished
expectations of privacy because "of their participation in an industry that is regulated
pervasively to ensure safety." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,
627 (1989). Because such employees are already subject to periodic physical exams and
other tests of their physical condition, the Court concluded that the drug testing at issue
"pose[d] only limited threats to the justifiable expectations of privacy of covered
employees." Id. at 628.
The Court's conclusion could be interpreted as based solely on the railroad employees'
subjectively reduced expectations of privacy in light of their past experiences. A more
reasonable interpretation, however, is that the finding of diminished expectations of privacy
is justified because of the strength of the government's interests in safety which underlie the
existing regulation, not the mere fact of regulation itself. Otherwise, the government could
invade even those areas traditionally shielded by great privacy simply by establishing
workplace regulations and practices intrusive of privacy. Through incremental incursions on
traditionally private areas, the public employer could ultimately render any employee
expectations of privacy "unreasonable." The point has been made before more generally by
those critical of the subjective prong of the reasonable expectations test. See, e.g.,
Amsterdam, supra note 136, at 384 (Under a purely subjective test, "the government could
diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly
on television... that we were all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic
surveillance."). To avoid rendering Fourth Amendment protections virtually meaningless
for government employees, the legitimacy of employee expectations of privacy must be
based on "'our societal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous
protection from government invasion[,I'" O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 715 (quoting Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)), rather than on the employees' subjective
expectations established solely through past employer practices.
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norms, not the specific practices of an individual defendant or industry, define
whether a plaintiff has a reasonable expectation ofprivacy.164
Thus, although unjustifiably intrusive employer practices might affect the
actual experiences of employees in that particular workplace, the mere fact that
such practices have been adopted cannot be determinative of what those
employees are reasonably entitled to expect, or what expectations of privacy
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.
Employee claims to privacy, then, are not defined or limited by
idiosyncratic practices in the particular workplace. Rather, the legitimacy of
employee expectations of privacy depends upon broadly recognized social
norms regarding privacy. These norms help define the community and its
delineation of the individual's place in it, and therefore, the society as a whole
has an interest in their maintenance. And because the harm threatened by
unjustified violations of these norms is the same whether they result from the
actions of one's employer or some other third party, the protection offered by
the common law tort of invasion of privacy to redress egregious violations
ought to be available in the employment context as well.
V. THE LlDrrs oF TE MARKET ARGUMENT
Providing legal protection of employee privacy is, of course, complicated
by the contractual nature of the employment relationship. To the extent that the
common law tort of invasion of privacy is applied to provide some minimum
guarantee of employee privacy, it will undoubtedly be criticized as an
unwarranted interference with the "free market." In a sense, there is no such
thing as a truly "unregulated market": every market is based on legal rules-
rules that establish the parties' starting positions and the bargaining ground
rules. 165 The question, therefore, is never whether legal rules should structure
the bargaining process-they inevitably do so--but how they should do so-an
inquiry that can only be answered by comparing the substantive outcomes that
result under alternative regimes.' 66 Nevertheless, the argument is frequently
made that rules addressing the substantive terms of an employment agreement
are presumptively invalid. To meet this argument, any proposal for imposing
even minimal protections for employee privacy rights must address two distinct
164 ffil V. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 671 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, ., concurring and
dissenting) (emphasis added).
165 Karl E. Kare makes this argument forcefully in the labor context in his article,
Woriplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction. An Agenda for Legal Reform, 38 CATH.
U. L. REy. 1, 17-18 (1988).
166 See id. at 17.
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but related claims. First, a laissez-faire approach is said to be superior to
alternative methods of structuring the employment relationship because it is
more efficient. Second, defenders of the traditional "unregulated" market
contend that it promotes individual autonomy. I examine each of these claims in
turn, as they might apply to the issue of employee privacy.
The argument based on efficiency looks to the "natural workings" of the
market to protect employee privacy interests. In the world of neoclassical
economics, employees seeking to maximize their well-being through a
combination of wages and working conditions will demand higher wages from
an employer who routinely invades their privacy. Conversely, employers who
are respectful of their employees' privacy will be able to pay a lower wage, in
effect shifting part of the compensation package from cash wages to more
desirable working conditions. To the extent that invading employee privacy
contributes to the overall productivity of the firm-by providing useful
information, say, or deterring employee wrongdoing-an employer will invade
employee privacy up to the point where the marginal utility of the additional
gains in information or deterrent effect equals the marginal cost of
compensating employees for further reductions in their privacy. This point
represents the efficient outcome at which employees have the optimal package
of wages and working conditions; no further trades can improve their
position.167 Thus, from the perspective of neoclassical economics, legal
protection of employee privacy rights is not only unnecessary, but actually
harms workers by prohibiting further trades (higher wages for less privacy) that
would increase their overall welfare.
The argument against protecting employee privacy rights based on
efficiency concerns is subject to both an internal and an external critique. The
internal critique questions the empirical validity of many of the assumptions
embedded in this description of the workings of the labor market. The
neoclassical market model begins with the assumption that there are numerous
rational actors (both employees and employers) bargaining under conditions of
perfect competition, full information, and no transaction costs. To the extent
that these assumptions do not hold true in the real world, the efficiency of the
market outcome is uncertain.
The objections to assuming conditions of perfect competition in the labor
market have been widely argued 168 and apply with equal force when
167 Of course, the equilibrium point is the efficient outcome only given the parties'
initial bargaining endowments and the market processes which structure their trades.
Different starting positions or a shift in their respective endowments, including legal
endowments, might result in further trades that benefit the worker.
168 See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAmps L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNiONs Do? 3-
25 (1984); PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERmNNGTHE WORKPLACE 73-78 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein,
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considering workplace privacy. The existence of information and transaction
cost barriers suggests that no real bargaining occurs over workplace conditions
affecting employee privacy. Prospective employees generally do not have
adequate information for assessing the intrusions entailed by an employer's
surveillance or monitoring practices, especially to the extent that those practices
are surreptitious. Although unable to observe the relevant conditions directly,
prospective employees are unlikely to raise any concerns about privacy during
the hiring process out of fear of signaling to the employer that they have
something to hide. Employers, who hold all the relevant information, will not
voluntarily reveal the presence of job conditions which might lead to demands
for higher wages. 169 Even assuming these signaling problems and
informational barriers could be overcome, the transaction costs involved in
negotiating over the variety of circumstances which might justify any of a
number of potential intrusions make true bargaining over the issue not only
inefficient, but virtually impossible. 170
The neoclassical economic account also assumes that the employer is a
rational actor and that there are no agency problems. However, to the extent
that individual managers act to increase their own felt power, even at the
expense of their employer's economic interests, workplace privacy, viewed as
an economic "good," will be underproduced. Such danger is especially acute
because of the nature of privacy interests. On the one hand, the costs to the
Rights, Minimal Term, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. Cm. L. REv. 1041, 1055 (1984);
Steven L. Willborn, Individual Employment Rights and the Standard Economic Objecion:
Theory and Empiricism, 67 NEB. L. REV. 101, 128 (1988); Note, Protecting At Wdl
Employees Against Wrong/ud Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1830-31 (1980).
169 Employers that respect privacy, however, might have an incentive to reveal the
favorable working conditions they offer to attract or retain high quality workers. See, e.g.,
Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). Even employers who
do not directly reveal their potentially invasive practices to prospective employees may be
concerned about reputational effects. Nevertheless, as discussed in the text, there are serious
reasons to doubt that sufficient information about workplace privacy issues is available to
the marginal worker (the one currently being recruited) to insure that employee privacy
concerns are adequately protected through the ordinary employment contracting process.
170 As Willborn points out, the problems of imperfect information and transaction
costs are compounded when a collective term-that is, an employment condition which is
provided to all employees if it is provided to one-is in issue. See Wiliborn, supra note 168,
at 120-27. Because workers may engage in strategic behavior to position themselves as free
riders, a collective good is likely to be underproduced in the sense that the employer may
not provide it, even though the cost of providing that good is less than its value to the
workers. See id. at 121. Certain workplace conditions affecting privacy-for example,
surveillance systems-appear to be collective terms susceptible to these difficulties.
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employee of losses of privacy will only be imperfectly internalized by the
company for the reasons discussed above. On the other hand, because of the
highly symbolic function played by privacy norms, their violation offers an
especially potent means for the manager to wield power over subordinates. 171
Even if the market is able to correct for such inefficiencies over time,
individual employees will suffer uncompensated harms from these invasions in
the short run.
The neoclassical market model likely fails to capture the realities of the
employment relationship in another critical way. In a perfectly competitive
market, employees are assumed to move freely from one job to another in a
series of costless (or relatively low-cost) transactions, seeking the best wage
and benefit package offered by a number of competing employers. However, a
considerable body of recent scholarship has concluded that in fact a significant
number of employment relationships are long-term rather than casual, and that
firms structure employment in such a way as to encourage employee
longevity. 172 Through progressive wage structures, internal promotion ladders,
and pensions and other benefits linked to years of service, employees are tied
ever more closely to their current jobs, making separation-whether voluntary
or not-increasingly costly to the worker. Although in theory free to leave in
search of better wages or working conditions, the employee cannot do so
without losing a substantial, firm-specific investment in both job skills and
seniority-linked benefits. 173 If long-term employees (those most likely to have
171 The tendency of a manager to use invasions of privacy to exercise power is
exacerbated by the ease with which such invasions may be undertaken. Particularly as
advancing technology steadily reduces the expense and effort required to implement
monitoring, testing, and surveillance systems, the temptation to use such technology without
fully considering its costs to the employee increases.
172 See WEMLER, supra note 168, at 63-64 and sources cited therein; see also Mathew
W. Finkin, The Bureaucratization of Work- Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 Wis.
L. REV. 733, 740-43 (1986); Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the
Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV.
457, 475-79 (1979). The common pattern of long-term employment after an initial period
of "job shopping" creates the potential for opportunism on both sides. See Stewart I.
Schwab, Life-Cyde Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment at Will, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 8, 20-28 (1993).
For employees, the phenomenon of "job lock" and the vulnerability it creates may be
exacerbated when an employee or her dependent has a pre-existing medical condition which
will no longer be covered if the employee loses her current health insurance along with her
job. The recently passed Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-191, 110 stat. 1936 (Aug. 21, 1996) (West, WESTLAW through 1996
legislation), only partially alleviates this latter aspect of the problem.
173 The frequency of mass layoffs in recent years has sometimes been taken as
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knowledge of a firm's practices affecting privacy) cannot easily substitute
another job for their current one, the discipline imposed by the market breaks
down, and employee privacy will likely be insufficiently protected.
Of course, labor market conditions vary greatly depending upon the
industry, skill level of the worker, and geographic location, and not all of the
market "imperfections" identified above necessarily affect every type of
employment. The important point is this: actual conditions deviate significantly
enough and often enough from the assumptions of a perfectly competitive labor
market that any reliance on the "unregulated" market to reach an "efficient"
level of protection for employee privacy is largely a matter of faith. Those who
believe that markets are the appropriate way to allocate all goods in society are
unlikely to be troubled by the efficiency concerns raised above. From their
perspective, exceptions to a laissez-faire regime are justified only in cases of
demonstrated market failure, and a presumptive faith in the workings of the
market to achieve substantively just outcomes is appropriate.
But aside from disputes over the actual efficiency of the labor market, the
neoclassical economic perspective is subject to an external critique that raises
far more fundamental objections. Implicit in traditional defenses of the
"unregulated market" is the moral claim that wealth maximization is the
appropriate normative principle for ordering social arrangements. This
principle of wealth maximization has been widely criticized, and the claim in its
strongest form has been virtually abandoned. 174 But even in a weaker form, in
which concerns of efficiency are not absolute, but are an important public-
policy consideration, the wealth-maximizing principle raises certain difficulties.
Its application to concrete problems necessarily requires that all desires,
preferences, wants, and values be reduced to a common currency, so that they
may be compared and exchanged. Margaret Radin, among others, has
condemned this "universal commodification," arguing that it endorses an
impoverished view of personhood:
evidence that the old pattern of lifetime, or at least career, employment no longer holds
true. However, even if workers can no longer expect a guarantee of lifetime employment, it
does not necessarily follow that jobs have become fungible. The loss of one's own job,
especially an involuntary loss after years spent working for one employer, is not easily
replaced. Evidence exists that laid off workers continue to experience earnings losses as
long as ten years after losing their jobs. See Fed Economist Says Layqffs Have a Long-Term
Impact on Earning Potential, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), May 16, 1996, at A-13.
174 Richard Posner has acknowledged that not all of the considerable criticisms leveled
against his use of wealth maximization as a normative theory can be answered.
Nevertheless, he maintains that wealth maximization remains a useful guiding principle in
common law adjudication for pragmatic reasons. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OpJURISPRUDENCE 374-87 (1990).
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Universal market rhetoric transforms our world of concrete persons, whose
uniqueness and individuality is expressed in specific personal attributes, into a
world of disembodied, fungible, attribute-less entities possessing a wealth of
alienable, severable "objects." This rhetoric reduces the conception of a person
to an abstract, fungible unit with no individuating characteristics. 175
Radin's critique of a universal market analysis is especially potent when
applied to issues of individual privacy. In order to analyze employee claims to
privacy in market terms, privacy must be understood as an alienable "good"-
something that can be possessed, measured, and exchanged for an equivalent
sum of money. It must be an object that exists apart from the individual for
which she has a discernible, measurable preference. However, this sort of
market rhetoric is particularly at odds with the highly normative conception of
privacy embedded in the law. As seen above, the common law tort of invasion
of privacy is closely linked to concerns of basic human dignity and personality.
Underlying the protections it affords is an implicit understanding that privacy
norms play a critical role in constituting identity-by providing a vehicle for
both recognition of the individual by others and expression of self through
social bonds with others. Moreover, the assumption that individual preferences
are exogenously determined is particularly inappropriate when discussing
concerns about privacy. Privacy norms are highly contextual, depending not
only upon the values of a particular society, but also the nature of the
relationship between the parties. Because privacy refers, not to some
objectively quantifiable good, but to the characterization of certain human
interactions, the neoclassical market model is a particularly inappropriate way
to evaluate claims of privacy.
Rejecting universal commodification as fostering an inferior conception of
human flourishing, Radin proposes a richer description of personhood, one
which conceives of the individual as "integrally connected to the world of
things and other people." 176 In rejecting the traditional liberal view of the
person as an abstract, isolated subject, Radin introduces the notion of
incomplete commodification. Rather than viewing all exchanges in purely
market terms, she argues that there is frequently an "irreducibly nonmarket or
nonmonetized aspect of human interaction going on." 177 Although "the sale of
a commodity" may be one way to describe what occurs between two parties, it
does not fully capture the meaning of their interaction. Deviations from a
175 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849, 1885
(1987).
176 Margaret Jane Radin, Justice and the Market Domain, in NOMOS XXXI:
MARKETS AND JUSTICn 178-79 (John W. Chapman & J. Roland Pennock eds., 1989).
177 Id. at 177.
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purely market economy may be understood as a way of preserving and
fostering these nonmarket aspects of exchange in order to promote human
flourishing, particularly when the goods at issue-housing, health care, or
political influence-are closely related to ideals of personhood and community.
In this view, regulation need not be justified solely on the grounds of market
failure, but may be seen as "a good-faith working out of community values, so
that persons and the community may properly flourish." i78
Once privacy is reconceived, not as an alienable good standing apart from
the individual, but as the necessary means by which the individual's standing in
the community is both recognized and expressed, the question of regulation
appears in a different light. Already, the employment relationship is regulated
in significant ways-for example, through the imposition of a minimum wage
and basic health and safety standards. These laws reflect a social judgment that
not all aspects of work or the worker should be subject to unfettered market
exchange; some aspects-for example, bodily integrity-are too closely related
to our ideals of personhood to allow them to be fully commodified. Similarly,
legal protection of employee privacy-at least of those areas recognized to be at
the core of individual privacy-need not depend on evidence of market
inefficiencies, but may be justified as a way of guaranteeing to the individual
the space necessary for human flourishing.
Distinct from claims about efficiency, a second argument which is
frequently made against any interference with the "natural" workings of the
market invokes principles of freedom of contract and autonomy. 179 Because the
parties to an employment relationship are in the best position to judge their
interests and the potential benefits and costs involved in contracting, the courts
and legislatures have no business inquiring into the terms of the bargain: "It
should be enough ... that the people who enter into an agreement have
manifested their consent to it." 180 In this view, if employer and employee agree
that the employment may be terminated for any reason at all-including
disputes over workplace privacy-then the law ought not to interfere with their
freedom to do so; the parties could as easily agree that the employer's power to
fire not extend to such a situation. Thus, employee privacy rights, like any
other term or condition of employment, would be established solely through the
assent of the bargaining parties.
Clearly, employee privacy rights can be established as a matter of contract.
178 Id. at 189.
179 "The first way to argue for the contract at will is to insist upon the importance of
freedom of contract as an end in itself. Freedom of contract is an aspect of individual
liberty .... ." Epstein, supra note 41, at 953.
180 RICLARD A. EPsTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DiSCRIMINATIONLAWS 149 (1992).
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When an employer explicitly undertakes to respect its employees' privacy, its
promises may be enforced like any other express term of an employment
contract. For example, in challenging her dismissal for dating a former
coworker who left to work for a competitor, the plaintiff in Rulon-Miller v.
IBM relied on a memo setting forth the company's "strict regard" for its
employees' personal privacy. 181 "[Biased on substantive direct contract rights"
flowing from IBM's policies, the court concluded that the plaintiff had a right
of privacy in her personal life. 182 Similarly, the court in Johnson v. Carpenter
Technology Corp.'83 permitted a breach of contract claim where the plaintiff
was fired after his employer allegedly failed to follow its own written
procedures for implementing a drug testing plan.184 Thus, an employer's
express policies or procedures relating to privacy may create enforceable
contract rights in the employee.18 5
A more difficult question arises when the employer invokes contract
principles to negate socially established expectations of privacy the employee
might otherwise have. Strict adherents of the principle of freedom of contract
would argue that even the most intrusive and degrading employer practices are
legally permissible so long as the employee has expressly or impliedly
consented to those conditions of employment.' 8 6 In Jennings v. Minco
181 Rulon-Miller v. IBM, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984). The memo,
which was signed by the Chairman of IBM, stated:
We have concern with an employee's off-the-job behavior only when it reduces his
ability to perform regular job assignments, interferes with the job performance of other
employees, or if his outside behavior affects the reputation of the company in a major
way.... Action should be taken [on the basis of such behavior] only when a legitimate
interest of the company is injured or jeopardized.
Id.
182 Id. at 532.
183 723 F. Supp. 180 (D. Conn. 1989).
184 See id. at 184.
185 To the extent that an employee's expectations of privacy are created wholly by
contract, they should be waivable on the same grounds. Consider as an example an
employer who has in the past provided private offices to certain of its professional
employees, but decides to reassign these same individuals to work stations in a large
common room. Although the affected employees have suffered a relative loss of privacy,
their changed working conditions may be seen as merely an adjustment in the contractual
terms of their employment. So long as no fundamental social norms regarding personal
privacy are threatened, the concerns I raise below about the voluntariness of consent are not
particularly urgent.
186 Of course, consent is a defense to a tort action for invasion of privacy. However,
the critical question here is not whether consent should be a defense, but whether
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Technology Labs, Inc.,187 the Texas Appeals Court relied on such reasoning to
reject a challenge to an employer's random drug testing plan. Under the
company's plan, employees were asked to provide a urine sample together with
written consent to its analysis.' 88 Although the court acknowledged that the
plan "obviously portends an invasion of [plaintiff's] privacy interest" and that
"privacy is an essential aspect of any tolerable way of life," 189 it concluded that
the employer "threatens no unlawfid invasion" of privacy, because the
urinalysis would be conducted only if the employee consented.190 Of course, if
an employee declined to consent to the testing, her employment might be
terminated. 191
The problem with the reasoning of the Jennings court and the usual
libertarian argument based on autonomy is that they fall to acknowledge that
the "voluntariness" of consent depends upon background conditions. An
employee offered the choice between submitting to an intrusive and degrading
search procedure required by her employer and losing her job might rationally
choose to undergo the search, particularly if she must rely on her income to
meet ongoing financial commitments or if she stands to lose a substantial and
irreplaceable investment in seniority and its attendant benefits accumulated over
her years of employment. Change any of these background conditions or, more
fundamentally, the distribution of legal entitlements (which currently may
permit the employer to fire her for objecting to even unjustified intrusions on
privacy), and she will no longer consent to the search. 192 Her consent may be
acquiescence obtained under threat of discharge constitutes valid consent.
187 765 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
188 See id at 498.
189 Id. at 499.
190 Id. at 502 (emphasis in original).
191 See id. at 498.
192 1 acknowledge that the force of this argument is considerably weakened if the
employer extracts the consent of the employee to potentially invasive tests or practices up
front, before she has made any significant investment in the particular job. Where a highly
compensated employee is fully informed of the extent, nature, and circumstances of any
required testing before she is hired and she nevertheless accepts the job, the concerns I raise
about the voluntariness of consent are less pressing. If there are indicia that full disclosure
and an opportunity for true bargaining occurred, conditions assuring a measure of
voluntariness are present. Not all prehire disclosures are sufficient to meet these concerns,
however. For example, in Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va.
1984), the employer, which operated a motel, apparently required applicants for positions
such as cleaning maid, to sign an agreement that they could be required to take a physical
exam, polygraph exam, and could be subjected to a search of their person, vehicle, and
personal effects whenever they were on the premises. See id. at 112-13 n.2. Such a blanket
waiver of the employee's privacy rights, with no specification of the scope of the waiver or
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considered "voluntary" in the sense that it is the product of deliberative choice;
however, from a broader perspective, which takes into account the concrete
circumstances in which the choice is made, her consent may be seen as
coerced. 193
The libertarian would reject such an argument out of hand, as did the
Jennings court: "A competent person's legal rights and obligations, [under
contract law], cannot vary according to his economic circumstances." 194
Nevertheless, even the strictest libertarian acknowledges that some
circumstances warrant setting contracts aside. 195 The easiest case is physical
duress; an agreement entered into under threat of physical harm will not be
enforced despite the apparent assent of the parties. This exception is generally
explained on the grounds that agreement was coerced, rather than truly
voluntary. However, as Kronman points out, such an agreement has in a sense
been voluntarily entered into: it represents the implementation of a rational
decision in response to the alternatives presented. 196 "Voluntariness," then,
depends on more than deliberative choice; we are also concerned about the
circumstances under which consent was given. Once this much is admitted,
however, a principled justification is required for considering some
the circumstances under which they might be tested or searched, also raises concerns about
the voluntariness of consent, particularly where the employees affected are low-skilled
workers unlikely to have significant negotiating power.
193 Taken to its logical extreme, strict adherence to the fiction of voluntary consent can
lead to absurd results. For example, in Texas Employment Comm'n v. Hughes Drilling
F/uids, 746 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988), the court considered whether an employee
who was fired when he refused to submit to urinalysis drug testing was disqualified from
receiving unemployment benefits. The court found that the employer's policies "require
[plaintiff] to give both his consent and the urine specimen." Id. at 800 (first emphasis
added). His refusal to "voluntarily" consent constituted "serious misconduct" justifying a
denial of benefits. Id. at 802. In effect, a doctrine based on the notion of voluntary
agreement became a requirement that consent be given.
194 Jennings v. Minco Tech. Labs, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
195 Physical duress, incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fraud, and
misrepresentation are readily acknowledged as limitations on the basic principle of freedom
of contract. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 80-82
(1995) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES].
196 Suppose that I sign a contract to sell my house for $5,000 after being physically
threatened by the buyer. It is possible to characterize my agreement as voluntary in one
sense: after considering the alternatives, I have concluded that my self-interest is best
served by signing and have deliberately implemented a perfectly rational decision by
doing precisely that.




circumstances (e.g. threats of physical harm) relevant to determining the
voluntariness of consent, and others (for example, economic necessity) not.
Epstein suggests that the assumption of mutual gain from exchange which
underlies the principle of freedom of contract also prescribes its limits: "When
bargaining takes place in settings where mutual gain is not the probable
outcome, there is sufficient warrant for the law to step in to set that transaction
aside." 197 He claims that this principle can explain the recognized common law
exceptions-like fraud, duress, and insanity-to enforcement of a contract.
However, in order to be useful as a limiting principle, Epstein's account must
be able to identify when "mutual gain" is and is not the "probable outcome."
If, as Epstein implies, mutual gain is presumed to result whenever rational,
self-interested actors freely consent to an exchange, then we are back to the
question of assessing the voluntariness of an agreement reached under a specific
set of concrete conditions. Without an independent theory to explain which
circumstances are relevant to determining whether consent was freely given, we
cannot assume that mutual gain will result from the mere fact that an exchange
has occurred.
My purpose here is not to offer a theory to resolve this line-drawing
problem. I point out the difficulty of finding a principled way to distinguish
fully voluntary from coerced agreements only in order to illustrate the
indeterminacy inherent in the notion of consent. Depending upon what
circumstances are deemed relevant to consider, the same contract may appear
more or less freely entered. Once this indeterminacy is recognized, invoking
the doctrine of consent no longer has conclusive weight. Rather, formal
application of the doctrine must be tempered with a recognition and
consideration of the concrete conditions under which consent was obtained.
When dealing with issues of privacy, this caution should apply with
particular force. As discussed above, privacy rights are crucially linked to an
individual's control over her territorial preserves. A loss of control
compromising individual privacy may be effected by coercing an individual to
waive her legitimate territorial claims, as well as by a direct intrusion. Thus,
when the employer of an at-will employee seeks access to those areas at the
socially recognized core of personal privacy, the employee's control over
territories of the self is seriously threatened. Although her claim to control
those core areas is heavily symbolic of her status as a member of the
community, the employee can now assert those claims only at great cost. If the
employee accedes to an employer's intrusion under such circumstances, a sort
of false intimacy results. The employer gains access to aspects of individual life
not legitimately within the scope of the employment relationship by wielding its
197 EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES, supra note 195, at 80.
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economic power, rather than through the truly unconstrained choices of the
employee. It is this possibility-that economic circumstances might induce the
employee to agree to a form of self-violation-that the formal doctrine of
consent fails to acknowledge.
VI. PRIVACY RIGHTS AS PUBLIC POLICY
At this point it is helpful to turn from abstract principle back to positive
law. While theorists may disagree about the conditions under which consent is
truly voluntary, the courts have increasingly been willing to acknowledge that
in the employment context "freedom of contract" may at times be illusory.' 98
Because employer and employee "do not stand on equal footing," 199 employer
power may be wielded to achieve socially undesirable ends. In order to
maintain "a proper balance" between "the employer's interest in operating a
198 For example, in interpreting Pennsylvania's statute restricting the use of polygraphs
in employment, the Third Circuit held that a consent form signed by an employee is not
valid to release the employer from liability when signing the release was required as a
condition of employment. See Polsky v. Radio Shack, 666 F.2d 824, 829 (3d Cir. 1981).
The court recognized that in such a situation, "'there [is no] assurance of true voluntariness
for the economic compulsions are generally such that the employee has no realistic
choice.'" Id. at 828 (quoting State v. Community Distrib., Inc., 317 A.2d 697, 699 (N.L
1974)).
InLeibowiz v. H.A. Winton Co., 493 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985), a Pennsylvania
court went even further, finding that a discharged employee might prove compulsion
invalidating a release of liability under the polygraph statute even in the absence of any
evidence that he was required to sign the release under threat of discharge. In light of the
"disparate positions of power" of employee and employer, the court held that the question
of the voluntariness of the release should go to the jury unless the employee had requested
the test himself, or the employer had explicitly assured him that taking the test was not a
necessary condition of employment. Id. at 116.
The recognition that apparent consent by an employee may mask actions taken under
economic compulsion also underlies judicial interpretation of Title VII as prohibiting sexual
harassment. Thus, the United States Supreme Court in Meitor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57 (1986), held that
the fact that sex-related conduct [between plaintiff and her supervisor] was "voluntary,"
in the sense that the complainant was not forced to participate against her will, is not a
defense to a sexual harassment suit brought under Title VII.... The correct inquiry is
whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary.
Id. at 68.
199 Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (I1. 1981).
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business efficiently and profitably, the employee's interest in earning a
livelihood, and society's interest in seeing its public policies carried out," 2oo
courts have stepped in to limit the employer's right of dismissal. Today, the
overwhelming majority of states recognize a public-policy exception to the at-
will rule.201
The seminal case is Petermann v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters,2°2 in which the plaintiff alleged that he was discharged for refusing
to give false testimony before a legislative committee at his employer's
direction.20 3 Although Petermann was an at-will employee, the court reasoned
that permitting an employer to condition the plaintiff's continued employment
on his committing perjury would encourage criminal conduct and "contaminate
the honest administration of public affairs." 204 Concluding that public policy
forbade such a result, the court found that the employer's right to discharge
may be limited by "considerations of public policy." 20 5
Numerous courts soon followed Petermann and recognized a cause of
action for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.206 Once an
exception to the at-will rule was admitted, courts struggled with the further
question of how "public policy" should be defined. In its broadest formulation,
"public policy concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of
the State collectively. "207 A few courts have focused on the nature of the
interests at stake, finding public policy to protect matters that "strike at the
heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and responsibilities." 208 More
commonly, courts have attempted to delineate the boundaries of public policy
by identifying its possible sources. Some states restrict the sources of public
200 R; see ako Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 105 (Colo. 1992);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 511 (N.J. 1980).
201 One recent survey of state court decisions found that out of the 50 states and the
District of Columbia, 44 jurisdictions have recognized a public-policy exception to the at-
will rule in one form or another, five have rejected it, and two have never addressed the
issue. 9A Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) IERM 505:51-3-4 (May 1996).
202 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
203 See id. at26.
204Id. at 27.
205 Id.
206 The cause of action is sometimes also called "abusive discharge," see, e.g., Adler
v. American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 473 (Md. 1981), or "retaliatory discharge,"
see, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 880 (IIl. 1981);
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973).
207 Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
208 Id. at 878-79; see also Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123,
1132 (Alaska 1989); Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022, 1026 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991).
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policy to criminal codes,20 9 or to express statutory or constitutional
provisions; 210 many consider judicial decisions a relevant source of public
policy as well.211
However defined, the public-policy exception is now widely recognized to
apply in at least three types of situations: when an employee is discharged for
refusing to commit an illegal act, for asserting an established job-related right
(for example, by filing for workers' compensation benefits), or for fulfilling a
public obligation (such as serving on jury duty).212 The justification for a
public-policy exception is often said to be the prevention of harm to third
parties. 213 While this rationale easily applies to most situations of the first type,
third-party effects are not always present when tort liability is imposed. The
second well-established exception to the at-will rule-a dismissal for
performing a public duty such as jury service-threatens no direct harm to
others. Although the integrity of the jury system as a whole may be affected,
209 See, e.g., Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991);
Miller v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 382 S.E.2d 16, 19 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); Sabine
Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 ('rex. 1985).
210 See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988); Gantt
v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687-88 (Cal. 1992); Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows,
666 S.W.2d 730, 732-33 (Ky. 1983); Lynch v. Blanke Baer & Bowey Krimko, Inc., 901
S.W.2d 147, 150 (Mo. 1995); Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822,
823-24 (Tenn. 1994); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis.
1983).
211 See, e.g., Luedtke, 768 P.2d at 1132; Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l. Hosp.,
710 P.2d 1025, 1034 (Ariz. 1985); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631
(Haw. 1982); Palnateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878; Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396
N.W.2d 588, 593 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987); Pierce v.
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980); Gutierrez v. Sundancer Indian
Jewelry, Inc., 868 P.2d 1266, 1272 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Painter v. Graley, 639 N.E.2d
51, 56 (Ohio 1994); Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 29 (Okla. 1989); Banaitis v.
Mitsubishi Bank, Ltd., 879 P.2d 1288, 1294 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Yetter, 585 A.2d at
1027; Johnson v. Kreiser's Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 227 (S.D. 1988); Payne v. Rozendaal,
520 A.2d 586, 588-89 (Vt. 1986); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089
(Wash. 1984); Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Fed. Say. & Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 640 (Wyo.
1990); cf. Cloutier v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1144 (N.H. 1981) (public
policy not limited to statute).
212 See, e.g., Sorensen v. Comm Tek, Inc., 799 P.2d 70, 74 (Idaho 1990) (listing
three categories of recognized public-policy exceptions); Yovino v. Fish, 539 N.E.2d 548,
550 (Mass. App. Ct. 1989) (same); Banaitis, 879 P.2d at 1293 (same). Some courts also list
a fourth type of commonly recognized public-policy exception: reporting an alleged
violation of law or whistle blowing. See Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684.
213 See Stewart j. Schwab, Wrongfid Discharge Law and the Search for Third-Parly
Effects, 74 TEX. L. RnV. 1943 (1996).
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even this danger is remote given the numerous exemptions from jury duty
already provided for in most state laws. This exception then, can only be
explained by the fundamental value this society places on jury service, rather
than any threat of actual harm to the public. It reflects a judgment that because
"the jury system and jury duty are regarded as high on the scale of American
institutions," 214 the employee should not be forced to choose between her job
and this basic form of political participation.
Third-party effects cannot explain the protection afforded employees who
file for workers' compensation benefits, either. Dismissal of these employees
would not harm anyone outside the employment relationship. Only the injured
employee, forced to choose between foregoing compensation benefits and
risking the loss of her job is affected. Of course, there is an important public
policy at stake-that of insuring adequate, certain, and expeditious support to
injured workers21 5-but that policy is not justified in terms of third-party
effects. The public may benefit indirectly, for example, if injured workers rely
less on public assistance, but the legislation is intended primarily for the
protection of the worker.216 Recognizing a public-policy exception in this
situation, then, protects not third parties, but the public interest in regulating
certain terms of the employment relationship itself and insuring that the threat
of discharge is not used to deprive workers of rights to which they are
otherwise entitled.217
Despite some uncertainty over how public policy should be defined, the
basic structure of the wrongful discharge tort is well established. An employee,
even an at-will employee, may seek damages from her employer for wrongful
discharge if the reasons for her dismissal are contrary to public policy. Her at-
will status is irrelevant because the requirements of public policy are
determined by the public interest and imposed independently of the terms of the
employment contract. Because the duty violated arises not from the parties'
agreement, but is one that is socially imposed, 218 most courts have held that the
cause of action sounds in tort, and the employer may be liable for all
consequential damages suffered by the dismissed employee and, in egregious
cases, punitive damages. 219
214 Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975).
215 See Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1973).
216 See id.
2 17 See id.; Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 734 (Ky. 1983).
218 See, e.g., Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 377-78 (Cal. 1988);
Phillips v. Butterball Farms Co., 531 N.W.2d 144, 147-48 (Mich. 1995).
219 A few states have followed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding in Brockmieyer
v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis. 1983), that the public-policy exception is
predicated on the breach of an implied provision not to discharge an employee for refusing
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The common law privacy tort, by prohibiting unreasonable intrusions on
the private concerns of another, also imposes a socially defined duty
independent of any contractual relationship between the parties. Like
participation in the jury system, respect for personal privacy is high on the
scale of values in this society. And, as in the case of workers' compensation
benefits, an employee's common law right of privacy is socially established
independent of the terms of the employment relationship 220 and should not be
subject to waiver under threat of discharge. Because the interests it protects are
at least as fundamental as others already found to warrant an exception to the
at-will rule, the common law tort of invasion of privacy should be recognized
as a public policy limiting an employer's authority to discharge.
It might be objected that privacy rights are by definition "private" and
therefore cannot be matters of "public" policy. 221 Despite its superficial
to violate a clear mandate of public policy and, therefore, only contract damages are
available. See, e.g., Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (Ark. 1988);
Johnson v. Kreiser's Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 227 (S.D. 1988). However, the overwhelming
weight of authority holds that wrongful termination in violation of public policy is a tort.
See Foley, 765 P.2d at 377-78; Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28, 34
(D.C. 1991); Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982); Springer
v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 560-61 (Iowa 1988); Firestone, 666 S.W.2d at
733; Phillips, 531 N.W.2d at 147-48; Phipps v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588,
592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), affd, 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987); Pierce v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980); Gutierrez v. Sundancer Indian Jewelry, Inc., 868
P.2d 1266, 1272 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994); Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24, 28 (Okla.
1989); Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213, 216 (S.C. 1985);
Reynolds v. Ozark Motor Lines, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Tenn. 1994); Thompson v.
St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Wash. 1984); Harless v. First Natl Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270, 275 n.5 (W. Va. 1978).
220 It may be argued that limiting the employer's right to discharge an employee for
claiming workers' compensation benefits is justified because the rights at issue are
statutorily granted, while the right of privacy is based solely on the common law. Why this
distinction should make a difference, however, is not entirely clear. See infra text
accompanying notes 225-28.
221 For example, the court in Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990), rejected a dismissed employee's claim that mandatory drug testing
violated her right of privacy on the grounds that "[t]he right to privacy is, by its very name,
a private right, not a public one" and therefore could not be the basis for a public-policy
exception to the at-will rule. Id. at 635.
In reaching this conclusion, the Luck court relied on the analysis employed by the
California Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
Foley alleged that he was fired in retaliation for informing his employer that his new
supervisor was under investigation for embezzlement from a previous employer. See id. at
375. In rejecting his wrongful discharge claim, the California Supreme Court stated:
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appeal, this argument misapprehends the nature of the interests at stake. The
function of a right of privacy is to delineate those territories or preserves which
are fundamental to the individual's sense of self and to provide legal sanction to
her claim to exclusive control within those boundaries. The location of those
boundaries is not a matter of individual choice or preference; rather, they are
socially defined, reflecting community norms and practices. Because the
privacy tort upholds those "civility rules" that "give normative shape and
substance to the society that shares them," 222 the general community, not just
the affected individual, has an interest in their enforcement.
To the extent that judicial decisions are recognized as sources of public
policy, protecting employee privacy rights by limiting an employer's authority
to fire at will poses no particular doctrinal difficulties. The common law tort of
invasion of privacy is widely recognized and clearly expresses a public policy
to protect individuals from "highly offensive" intrusions on their solitude or
private affairs and concerns. 223 In jurisdictions where state or federal
The absence of a distinctly "public" interest in this case is apparent when we consider
that if an employer and employee were arpressly to agree that the employee has no
obligation to, and should not, inform the employer of any adverse information the
employee learns about a fellow employee's background, nothing in the state's public
policy would render such an agreement void. By contrast, in the previous cases
asserting a discharge in violation of public policy, the public interest at stake was
invariably one which could not properly be circumvented by agreement of the parties.
Id at 380 n.12 (emphasis in original).
Applying this test to the facts before it, the Luck court concluded that "[t]he parties
could have lawfully agreed that Luck would submit to urinalysis without violating any
public interest." Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 635. The problem with the test advanced by the
Foley court is that it is wholly tautological. It merely identifies the central question-whether
an agreement to do or refrain from certain actions is so offensive to public policy as to be
void-but does not help to answer it. Under this test, the court in Luck could just as easily
have concluded, as did the court in Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280, 285 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990), that an employment agreement conditioned on submission to random drug testing is
unenforceable as violative of public policy.
222 Post, supra note 94, at 964.
223 Generally, exceptions to the at-will rule must be based on a "clear mandate of
public policy," and some courts have taken the vigorous public debate over the legitimacy
of employer surveillance and testing policies as evidence that privacy rights are not "firmly
established." See, e.g., Luck, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 635. This argument, however, confuses the
status of the underlying right with its application in a particular situation. No one seriously
doubts the fundamental value placed on free speech in our constitutional jurisprudence,
despite heated debates over its force and scope when it clashes with other important social
interests. Similarly, the common law right of privacy is clearly established in this sense:
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constitutional provisions are also recognized as appropriate sources of public
policy, the case for recognizing protection of employee privacy as an exception
to the at-will rule is further buttressed. Although they rarely apply directly to
private actors, the widely recognized constitutional protections of personal
privacy may properly be looked to as evidence of public values.224
Some jurisdictions, however, insist that any exception to the at-will rule
must have a statutory basis,225 precluding reliance on the common law right of
privacy as a source of public policy. Such a rule which looks only to statutes to
provide public policy can lead to "legal contortions" 226 as courts attempt to fit
terminations generally offensive to public policy into the narrow parameters of
existing statutes. The rationale for requiring such contortions before
recognizing a public policy are not at all clear, for judicial decisions often
embody fundamental public concerns as significant as those expressed by
statute.
The argument that the declaration of public policy is the prerogative of the
legislature, not the courts, proves too much. If the legislature is the only
legitimate source of public policy, the courts ought not recognize any
exceptions to the at-will rule. The legislature could as easily prohibit
terminating an employee for refusing to commit perjury as the perjury itself. Its
failure to do so arguably represents a policy choice. Similarly, the legislature
could specifically prohibit retaliation against workers who file for compensation
virtually all jurisdictions unambiguously prohibit offensive intrusions by private actors.
Although application to a particular employer practice may be disputed, the existence of a
common law right of privacy is clear.
224 See, e.g., Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123, 1132-33
(Alaska 1989) (finding that although Alaska's constitutional right of privacy directly limits
only state action, it provides evidence of a general public policy supporting privacy); see
also Grodin, supra note 159; Summers, supra note 159; cf. Novosel v. Nationwide Ins.
Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding that constitutional rights of freedom of
speech and association express a public policy sufficient to support a common law action for
wrongfil discharge).
225 See cases cited supra note 209. To the extent that an employee's claim of invasion
of privacy relates to an employer practice which is specifically regulated by state statute, she
would have little difficulty in stating a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1365-66 (3d Cir.
1979). For references compiling state statutes regulating specific employer testing or
information-gathering practices, see sources cited supra note 16. Only a few states,
however, have a statute protecting individual privacy rights generally. See MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 214, § 1B (West 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-203 (1991); R.L GEN.
LAWS § 9-1-28.1 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1983).
226 STEVEN L. WILLBoRN mT AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 84
(1993).
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benefits; yet, courts have been willing to infer that the public policy articulated
in the enacting legislation forbids such retaliatory discharges even though the
legislature chose not to say so explicitly.227 By their very involvement in
extrapolating public policy from existing statutes, and applying them in the
context of at-will employment, the courts have acknowledged that they have
some role in interpreting public policy. And by failing to act to overturn well-
established common law rules, the legislature implicitly endorses the public
policies they articulate.228
For a number of reasons, privacy rights are particularly well-suited for
common law development. Claims of invasion of privacy are highly fact
specific; their validity cannot be assessed without close examination of the
context in which they arise. Moreover, privacy norms themselves are
constantly evolving, not only in response to a changing social context, but also
rapidly emerging technologies which often produce unanticipated impacts on
privacy interests. Because legislative protection of privacy is necessarily
piecemeal and reactive in light of such rapid change, limiting the source of
public policy to specific statutes seems especially inappropriate when
considering issues of privacy.
But if the distinction between statutory and common law as valid sources of
public policy is arbitrary, some other method of distinguishing truly public
from merely personal concerns is needed. Clearly, not every dispute between
employee and employer is a matter of public policy; purely personal disputes
are properly excluded. 229 In Governing the Workplace, Weiler offers a more
227 See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1973);
Firestone Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730, 732 (Ky. 1983); Sventko v.
Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976).
228 There is no unfairness to the employer in recognizing judicial decisions as a source
of public policy. As Justice Kennard pointed out in her dissent from the California Supreme
Court's ruling that the public-policy exception must be based on constitutional or statutory
provisions, "Other legitimate sources of public policy, such as judicial decisions or codes of
professional ethics, for instance, are readily available to employers or their counsel and thus
provide no less 'notice' than do statutes or constitutional provisions." Gantt v. Sentry Ins.,
824 P.2d 680, 693 (Cal. 1992) (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Employers know
that their conduct is bound by judicially announced rules as well as statutes and cannot
complain of lack of notice if they are held liable for terminating an employee in order to
evade a common law duty.
229 Courts have uniformly rejected employee claims of wrongful discharge when the
dismissal resulted from disputes over internal management issues. See, e.g., Palmateer v.
International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (11l. 1981) (citing cases in which public-
policy exception not allowed where worker discharged in dispute over a company's internal
management system); Smith-Pfeffer v. Superintendent of the Walter E. Fernald State
School, 533 N.E.2d 1368, 1371-72 (Mass. 1989) (finding internal policy matters cannot be
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precise test for identifying public policy:
This tort action [for wrongful dismissal] should be available whenever an
employer has exercised its contractual prerogative to terminate the worker's
employment and in the process has flouted some value that has been
authoritatively declared by the legislature or the judiciary to be in the general
interest of the community. The best test of that status would be whether the
policy in question is implemented through a legal regime that operates outside
the dismissal contet.23 0
Legal protections for personal privacy are well established outside the
employment context: offensive intrusions by private actors are prohibited under
the common law, and government actions impinging on individual privacy are
restricted by the Constitution. Therefore, under Weiler's test, protection of
employee privacy is sufficiently grounded in public policy to warrant an
exception to the employer's ordinary prerogative to discharge at will.
Once the common law right of privacy is recognized as a public policy
limiting the at-will rule, the employee stands in a wholly different position
when confronted with potentially intrusive practices by her employer. Without
such protection, the employer may unilaterally impose any search, testing, or
surveillance procedure whether or not it is justified by business needs. No
matter how unreasonable and degrading the intrusion, the employee faces a
stark choice: either go along and waive her rights or object and risk losing her
job. The recognition of employee privacy as a public policy works a shift in the
bargaining endowments of the parties. Employers can no longer insist on
burdening their employees' core privacy interests on threat of discharge, but
must take account of prevailing social norms. Privacy rights will continue to be
controversial; genuine disagreement over core privacy values will inevitably
occur. But because of the potential for liability for threatening unjustified
invasions of privacy, the employer now has a greater incentive to take account
of employee concerns over the intrusiveness of a given practice and to develop
procedures and alternatives for meeting its legitimate business needs which are
less threatening to privacy interests. And the employee, offered some
protection against the risks of job loss, is in a better position to raise concerns
about personal privacy with her employer.
Opposing potentially invasive practices by the employer is not without risk
for the employee, however. If she is fired in retaliation for her opposition, she
the basis of a public-policy exception to the at-will rule); Turner v. Letterkenny Fed. Credit
Union, 505 A.2d 259, 261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (refusing to recognize an exception to the
at-will rule when employee dismissed because of disputes with management and fellow
employees).230 WEILER, supra note 168, at 100 (emphasis added).
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would only be entitled to legal redress if the employer's actions had threatened
a "highly offensive" intrusion on her privacy, a determination which would be
made by reference to the norms of the community as a whole. Although the
employee's subjective sense of violation and outrage alone would be
insufficient to find a violation of public policy, whenever an employer
threatened to use its economic power to invade core privacy interests, the
employee would be protected in resisting the intrusion. Thus, recognizing
employee privacy rights as a public-policy exception to the at-will rule would
serve the very interests the common law tort is intended to safeguard-the
"civility rules" which not only express the normative boundaries of the
community, but define the individual's place in it.
VII. CONCLUSION
Articulating why we should care about privacy in the employment context
and how we should protect it is complicated by the lack of consensus as to the
meaning and value of privacy in general. With no widely accepted definition of
"privacy" in use, debates about privacy protections often stall at the
definitional stage, while concrete questions go unresolved. Yet despite its
uncertain philosophical status, privacy remains a strongly held value, an
instinctively felt need, such that perceived losses of privacy may be experienced
by the individual as a form of violation.
In this Article, I have attempted to sidestep the definitional problems and
address directly the legitimacy of employee concerns about invasions of privacy
by employers. I have adopted a functional approach-examining the role that
privacy norms, popularly understood, play in our social life, and exploring the
interests of the individual in the observation and enforcement of those norms.
Borrowing the insights of sociology, I have argued that the observation of
privacy norms plays a central role in establishing the individual's standing in
the community and is crucial to her sense of self. I have not been concerned so
much with the precise content of these norms, as with the individual's ability to
control when and with whom they will be waived.
Applying these insights in the employment setting, I have argued that
employees retain their ordinary, socially established expectations of privacy in
the workplace, except to the extent that waiver is required to achieve the
purposes of the relationship itself. Any employer intrusion on core aspects of
personal privacy thus requires justification, not only as to its purpose, but also
as to the scope of the intrusion as well. Because of the danger that economic
power might be wielded to induce a form of self-violation, I have argued that
common law privacy rights should be recognized as a limitation on the
traditional prerogative of the employer to fire at will.
19961
730 OHIO STATE LAWJOURAL [Vol. 57:671
In focusing on the role played by privacy norms in social interaction, I
have left aside concerns about what exactly the scope of privacy protections
ought to be. Many others have argued that our society and laws are
insufficiently protective of individual privacy. They warn that through
incremental incursions, each justified in the name of some greater good, we are
insensibly becoming acclimated to ever greater losses of privacy. Because the
common law tort of invasion of privacy looks to prevailing social norms to
delineate the areas it protects, employee privacy rights are similarly vulnerable.
To a large extent, the protection afforded to employees depends upon an
evolving social consensus, for privacy interests in the employment context can
be no more secure than they are in the society as a whole. While much work
undoubtedly needs to be done to protect personal privacy against both
governmental and private intrusion, my more limited concern here has been to
argue that the fact of employment should make it no less secure.
